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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Out of pocket (OOP) payments is one of the single largest sources of health care financing in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (McIntyre et al. 2006). In 2002, OOP expenditures constituted 51% to 90% 
of the private health expenditure in 14 countries and 91% to 100% in 24 African countries 
(Kirigia et al. 2006). In the same year, OOP constituted over 50% of the private health 
  
expenditure in 38 countries. This clearly indicates that households make a significant 
contribution to health expenditure in the majority of the countries of the Region. OOP payments 
are in form of direct payments, which households pay at the point of use of health services. It 
includes spending on such things as consultation fees, investigatory tests, hospitalization and 
pharmaceuticals but excludes expenditure on transportation to obtain care and special nutrition 
(Castano et al. 2002). OOP payments are net of any insurance reimbursement. They may include 
co-payments for used public health services but also many other formal and informal payments, 
such as non-prescription drugs, private medical care payments, or ”under-the-table payments” 
for gifts and gratitude money for health care providers (Mastilica, Bozikov 1999).  
 
In Zambia, OOP payments are substantial, accounting for approximately 29 percent of total 
health expenditure in 2004 (Ministry of Health Zambia 2006). In the same year, compared to 
other financing sources, OOP was second only to donor funding which accounted for 38 percent, 
followed by Ministry of Finance with 24 percent, employers with 6 percent and other sources 
with 3 percent. In a multi-country analysis undertaken by Leive and Xu ( 2008) to assess how 
households cope with OOP payments in 15 countries, Zambia was one of the countries with the 
highest prevalence of OOP payments, ranking higher than some African countries such as 
Swaziland, Namibia, Mauritania and Malawi.  
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
From the time Zambia got its independence from Britain, the government had been providing 
free health care services for all (Ministry of Health/Republic of Zambia. 2004). However, it 
became increasingly difficult to sustain this system especially when in the mid 1970s the country 
started experiencing macroeconomic challenges. This resulted in adverse effects on health and 
was compounded by increased poverty, inequality and unemployment and contractions in per 
capita household incomes and GDP. Ultimately, the public sector‟s ability to finance the 
provision of health care services diminished over time. In the wake of these challenges, there 
was an emergence of liberal economic reforms in many parts of Africa, popularly known as 
„Structural Adjustment Programmes‟ (SAPs). The main theme of these reforms among others 
was the removal of public subsidies and withdrawal of direct government provision of many 
social services including health care (McPherson 1995). Under the circumstances, the newly 
  
elected government, supported by donors, also referred to as cooperating partners in the Zambian 
health literature (Ministry of Health 2005, Republic of Zambia 2006), began in the early 1990s to 
rationalize that, if rich countries could not afford to provide free services to their populations, 
poor countries like Zambia could similarly not afford to sustain their “free-for-all” health 
policies. Thus, in 1992, far-reaching national health reforms were initiated. A major tenet of the 
reforms was the cost-sharing health policy (introduced in 1993), which saw Zambia introducing 
user fees in all public facilities at all levels of care. Patients were now required to pay at the point 
of use of health services.  
These health reforms were initially greeted with enthusiasm, and some positive changes were 
recorded in the early years of the reform implementation (Gilson et al. 2003). In years that 
followed however there has been a reversal of the situation causing a waning of interest in the 
health reforms and increased skepticism. This generated intense (and on-going) debate about the 
ability of the reforms to foster a number of things including better coverage, equity and ease of 
access to health care (Blas, Limbambala 2001, Malama et al. 2002, van der Geest et al. 2000). 
The subject of user fees is at the center of the health reforms and health policy debate as a key 
policy instrument for health care financing. A key anxiety in this regard concerns the health and 
socio-economic implications of user fees as a financing option, particularly given the poverty 
context of health in Zambia. (Masiye et al. 2008) observe that implementing user fees in a health 
setting with widespread poverty and poor key health indicators has been very challenging. 
Contrary to expectations, user fees resulted in lower utilization rates and denied more people, 
especially the poor, access to health care. During the same period about 22% of urban and 30% 
of rural patients were turned away from health facilities because they could not pay for services 
upfront (Kondo, McPake 2007). User fees were later abolished in April 2006.  
 
The abolition of user fees however only covers primary health care in rural areas. Urban dwellers 
as well as rural people who need health care not available at primary level still have to pay OOP.  
Because the cost of provision of services at the higher levels is higher, OOP has remained 
considerably high despite the policy of user fees removal. OOP payments (World Health 
Organisation 2010) accounted for 71.4% of total private health expenditure in 2004. This was 
higher than in similar countries in the region such as Zimbabwe with 50.7%, Malawi, 35.2%, 
Botswana 27.8% as well as Uganda with 51%. The magnitude of OOP as a share of private 
  
expenditure in Zambia also suggests that the level of prepayments in form of private health 
insurance is very low. For example, between 2002 and 2006 private prepayment plans as a 
percentage of private health expenditure ranged from 0.9% to 3.7% (ibid). In fact, in the 1995-98 
National Health Accounts there was no component of prepayments because it was non-existent 
at the time (Ministry of Health/ Central Board of Health 1998). On the other hand, tax funding 
has remained a key health financing mechanism in the country. However, the health sector 
experienced shrinking budgetary allocations after the adoption of SAPs as earlier mentioned. 
 
Given this lack of general health insurance and reduced budgets to the health sector most 
households, rural and urban have remained relying on out of pocket payments to finance health 
care. However, out of pocket payments may not be a good way of paying for care because it has 
never been possible for health systems around the world to demand that out of pocket are made 
according to ability to pay. This is because payments are mostly made at the point of use of 
health services without considering the payers initial income. This tend to be inequitable in the 
sense that both poor and rich are made to face similar health costs. But equity of financing 
requires that payments are made according to one‟s ability to pay. This is a desirable policy 
objective in most of the countries today. Given the nature of out of pocket payments this may be 
hard to achieve especially in Zambia where the majority of the population is poor. . For this 
reason health systems seek to reduce out of pocket payments as much as possible.  
The inequitable nature of  OOP payments especially in poor countries is one of the main reasons 
leading to user fee removal for health care in many African countries. For example the 
inequitable nature of OOP payments led to the abolition of user fees for health care in Uganda in 
2001 (Xu et al. 2006). . Thereafter the South African, , Government in an effort to reduce the 
inequity of out of pocket payments and other effects introduced a policy of universal access to 
free primary health care by removing user fees for everyone (Wilkinson et al. 2001). This is an 
indication that OOP payments are inequitable and with them it may be difficult to achieve 
universal coverage. Countries where out of pocket payments have remained predominant tend to 
introduce user fee exemptions as a measure of equity. However, research has shown that user fee 
exemptions have not rightly beed implemented and targeted. For example,. Exemptions were 
implemented soon after the introduction of user fees in Zambia. However, it has been reported 
that like in many other countries, exemptions in Zambia were very ineffective in reaching the 
  
target population (Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre 2010). Hence the equity objectives they were 
meant to achieve were not successful. In other countries out of pocket payments are replaced 
with alternative sources of financing such as prepayment schemes which do not require people to 
pay at the point of use of health services. However, prepayment schemes in Zambia are almost 
insignificant and where they are found they are only accessible by people of high socio-
economic status who happens to be a minute proportion of the Zambian population.  
 
1.2 STUDY RATIONALE 
The need for health care financing mechanisms that are progressive in Zambia cannot be over-
emphasized. It is necessary that health care financing mechanisms are in such a way that they are 
related to ability to pay. this is an equity objective.. This is the main motivation for this study. It 
is envisaged that this study will provide empirical evidence on the progressivity and 
determinants of OOP payments.  This information is important for policy making regarding 
health care financing. 
 
The starting point in considering equity in financing health care is the requirement that health 
care ought to be financed according to the ability to pay (O'Donnell et al. 2008). This is the 
principle of vertical equity, which requires that individuals with unequal ability to pay should 
pay disproportionately unequally. An equitable health care system would be one in which 
payments for health care are positively related to the ability to pay. It is not still clear whether 
out of pocket payments are progressive and can foster equity in the financing of health care in 
Zambia. This study will provide an empirical assessment of OOP financing in Zambia and its 
equity implications. Such evidence is important in formulating policies that will provide for an 
equitable health financing system in the country. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY   
The main objective of the study is to assess the progressivity and determinants of OOP health 
care payments in Zambia. 
 
  
1.3.1 Specific Objectives 
More specifically the study will seek to; 
 Measure OOP health expenditure as a share of total household expenditure and compare 
across different socio-economic groups between 1998 and 2006. 
 Determine the characteristics of households who make OOP health care payments 
 Assess factors associated with the amount of OOP health care payments.  
  Compare the progressivity of OOP payments in 1998, 2004 and 2006 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) health care payments refer to payments made by households at the point of 
receiving health services. It includes spending on alternative and/or traditional medicine but may 
exclude expenditure on transportation to obtain care and special nutrition as these are related to 
different policy levers than payments for health services (World Health Organisation 2005). 
OOP is usually contrasted with other forms of paying for health care such as social health 
insurance and general tax funding which are in form of prepayments. Health care financing in 
Zambia is a combination of all of these payment mechanisms.  
 
There are important issues raised against the use of OOP payments as a means of financing 
health care in many countries. Major among these is that of equity. That is, whether paying OOP 
is progressive or not. The other important issue is that of financial risk protection. Usually it is 
not enough for a financing mechanism to be equitable; it should also offer financial risk 
protection to those using it to pay for health care. That is to say, people‟s living standards should 
not fall considerably after incurring health expenditures. 
 
1.4.1 Progressivity of OOP payments 
A financing mechanism is progressive if high-income groups contribute a higher percentage of 
their income than do low income groups (McIntyre et al. 2008). In other words, progressivity 
measures the deviation from proportionality in the relationship between health payment and 
ability to pay (ATP) (Yu, Whynes & Sach 2008). It reveals the extent of inequality in paying for 
health care services between households of unequal ATP. A health payment is progressive if it 
  
accounts for an increasing proportion of ATP as ATP rises. A progressive system means that the 
individuals or households with greater ATP are paying more proportionally in financing health 
care. Progressivity of OOP payments can easily be determined by comparing ones level of OOP 
payments with their total income over a given period of time and then compare this across 
different socio-economic classes. It can also be measured in different other ways such as using 
the Kakwani index. The Kakwani index (Kakwani 1977) is one of the most common summary 
measures of progressivity. It is defined as twice the area between a payment concentration curve 
and the Lorenz curve and is calculated by taking the difference between the health payments 
concentration curve and the gini coefficient of ATP. A negative Kakwani index indicates 
regressivity; while a positive Kakwani index indicates progressivity. In the case of 
proportionality the index is zero.  
 
 
OOP payments have been found to be progressive in some African countries. For example, in 
Tanzania, between 1992 and 2002 Manzi et al (2005) found that OOP increased with the level of 
socio-economic status, with the least poor paying 2.5 times more than the poorest. This result 
was attributed to the presence of user fees and incomplete implementation of exemption and 
waiver mechanisms. Hence making everyone to face the same health costs regardless of their 
ability to pay which consequently makes the system appear progressive when more payments are 
made by those in high socio-economic status compared to those in low socio-economic status. In 
1997, O‟Donnell et al (2008) also found that OOP payment was progressive in Egypt. While 
assessing various sources of health financing, the authors point out that OOP payment was one of 
the sources that contributed to the overall progressivity of the entire health financing system in 
Egypt. OOP was progressive compared to other sources of financing such as cigarette tax, social 
insurance contributions as well as private insurance premiums which had Kakwani indices of –
0.0061, –0.0532 and –0.0011 respectively while OOP had a Kakwani index of 0.0644. This 
progressivity has been associated with the presence of out of pocket payments. However, the 
author argues that in as much as OOP was found progressive in Egypt, it was the least 
progressive of all the financing sources under investigation. Compared with other sources, direct 
personal taxes were the most progressive followed by indirect taxes with Kakwani indices of 
0.2501 and 0.1435 respectively.  
  
 
Outside of Africa, especially in some developing countries, OOP payments have been 
progressive. For example in India, Gag and Karan observe that between 1999 and 2000 poorer 
quintiles of the population spent a relatively lower proportion of their expenditure OOP than 
their rich counterparts. Reasons given are that OOP constituted the largest share of health 
expenditure and varied between 80-70% of health expenditure and 95% of private at the 
moment. There was also a weak insurance and community financing emerging at the time. The 
apparent progressivity was at the expense of the poor households who could not afford to pay out 
of pocket as much as the rich households. A similar observation was made in Malaysia by Yu et 
al (2008) between 1989 and 1999. The progressivity of OOP observed was as a result of the 
switch by the rich to private health services and the predominant reliance on subsidized public 
health services by the poor. Implying that, most out of pocket payments were made by those 
belonging to high socio-economic status. Other developing countries with progressive OOP 
payments for health care include Nepal and Bangladesh in 1996 and 2000 respectively. In Nepal 
the reasons for progressivity are that while both the rich and poor use public facilities, the rich 
are prescribed expensive medicines while the poor are prescribed cheap medicines. Even then, 
the poor cannot afford to buy the prescribed medicines. Hence most of the out of pocket 
payments were incurred by the rich. In Bangladesh health was financed almost exclusively from 
OOP and tax revenues. 
 
1.4.2 Regressivity of OOP payments 
Regressivity is the exact opposite of progressivity and can be measured and determined in a 
similar way. In this case, the Kakwani index will be negative.   
 
In Africa a clear demonstration of the regressivity of OOP payments is given in Cisśe et al 
(2007). In a study of four francophone West African countries (Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal and 
Mali) between 1998 and 1999 the authors observe that OOP payments were regressive in all of 
the four countries. The authors claim that this regressivity is due to the presence of user fees and 
cost recovery policies implemented in the early years before the study was done , making 
households to face similar health costs regardless of variations in their ability to pay. Similarly, 
Perkins et al (2009) found regressive OOP payments in Burkina Faso, Kenya and Tanzania. 
  
Investigating OOP costs for facility-based maternity care between 2003 and 2006, the authors 
conclude that women in the poorest wealth quintile did not pay significantly less for maternity 
costs than the wealthiest women. Like in Cisse et al (2007) this regressivity of maternity costs 
was attributed to the presence of user fees in health facilities for each of the countries. 
Regressive OOP payments were also found in Ghana and South Africa between 2005 and 2006 
(Ataguba et al, 2009). In Ghana, the regressivity observed was attributed to the cost-sharing 
policies obtaining at the time which lead to high incidence of OOP payments. Additionally, 
social health insurance was in its developing stages and could not provide comprehensive cover 
for the entire population. In South Africa regressivity of OOP payments was due to the presence 
of private financing which exposed poor households to the same health costs as the rich 
households. 
 
In other low income countries outside of Africa evidence show that OOP is a regressive way of 
paying for health care. For example, in Vietnam, Thuan et al (2006) found that between 2001 
and 2002 poorer households paid a larger share of their curative health expenditure compared to 
the rich. Reasons being that in earlier decades the government had introduced economic policies 
that led to increases in OOP health expenditures. This was despite varying levels of socio-
economic status in the country. In Thailand, Pannarunothai and Mills (1997) observe that under-
privileged families spent OOP as much as 5-6% of their household income on health care 
whereas other groups spent 1-2%. Reasons for the regressive OOP payments are that most low 
income families lacked health benefit or were without the low income card which would allow 
them to access subsidized health care. There was also an increase in the prevalence of user fees 
for the uninsured. 
 
1.4.3 Determinants of OOP payments 
In conclusion, Rubin and Koellin (1993) identify several factors or characteristics of households 
in the United States of America that are likely to incur OOP health care payments. Among them 
is household income, age and education of household head, size of the household as well as 
health insurance status of the household. Others are housing tenure, household assets, race and 
welfare status of a household. The study results showed that single headed households had the 
lowest OOP spending while white and high income households including those with higher 
  
education incurred higher levels of medical expenses than lower income and non-white 
households. The same was true for the less educated.  On the other hand, housing tenure and 
household welfare status were negatively related to OOP expenditure. Contrary to the 
expectations of the authors that ownership of insurance will lead to low OOP, the insurance 
parameter was positive. 
 
1.5 Methods 
1.5.1 Data Sources  
This study will be based on three rounds of the Zambian Living Conditions and Monitoring 
Surveys (LCMS) – 1998, 2004, and 2006. These are nationally representative surveys conducted 
by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) as shown in Table 1. The LCMS contains 
information on several modules including demographic, health, education, household 
expenditure, household access to various amenities and facilities. They contain individual as well 
as household level information. Individual level data includes some relevant socio-demographic 
information (age, sex, education, urban/rural location etc). Relevant household level data include 
total household consumption, total household expenditure as well as OOP health expenditure.  
Table 1: Survey Sample Sizes and Data Collection Periods 
Survey Name Approximate Sample 
Size 
(Households) 
Date of Collection 
Living Conditions Monitoring II  16,740 November-December (1998) 
Living Conditions Monitoring IV  19,000 November-December (2004) 
Living Conditions Monitoring V  18,000 November-December (2006) 
 
 
1.5.2 Statistical Methods 
a. Estimating OOP payments 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments refer to payments made by households at the point they 
receive health services. These payments are not reimbursed by any prepayment scheme. They 
could either be paid at a public or private facility. In this analysis, OOP payments will include 
costs of medicines, fees to medical personnel (e.g. Doctor / Health Assistant / Midwife / Nurse / 
  
Dentist, etc), payments to hospital/health centre/surgery as well as fees to traditional healer. 
However, expenditure on health-related transportation will be excluded. This avoids imputation 
of transport costs for households using private means of transportation. Total OOP expenditures 
for each household will be adjusted by adult-equivalent household size to reflect each household 
member‟s OOP payment experience. 
b. Measuring Socio-economic Status 
Total household expenditure will be used to estimate household socio-economic status in all the 
three periods considered. This is in line with the World Bank‟s recommendations for developing 
countries (Grosh, Glewwe 2000). Compared to income, there is less variability in household 
expenditure. Furthermore, total household expenditure will be adjusted for household size and 
composition using equivalised household size to obtain equivalent household expenditure. 
Equivalised household size will be obtained as follows: 
 
 
Where eqsize represents the number of consumption equivalents in the household                                             
and hhsize is the actual size. The value of β is estimated at 0.56 from data from 59 countries 
using fixed effects regression (Xu et al. 2003). This value is now being used as representative 
value in empirical studies of this nature Households will further be categorized into five quintiles 
of socio-economic status using the equivalent household expenditure. In all analyses, sample 
weights will be applied and the unit of analysis is the household. All analyses will be carried out 
using STATA
TM
 10 software. 
 
c. Estimating Progressivity of OOP Payments. 
To estimate the progressivity of OOP payments the study will first estimate OOP payment as a 
percentage of total household expenditure. Progressivity of OOP payments will be assessed 
using the Kakwani Index of progressivity (Kakwani 1977). This is defined as the difference 
between the Gini coefficient for income (or expenditure) distribution (G) and the concentration 
index for the distribution of OOP payments (C). The Gini index follows a univariate distribution 
(i.e. solely measures income distribution (ability to pay) while the concentration index follows a 
bivariate distribution. For example, in this case comparing the distribution of out of pocket 
  
payments to household ability to pay variable e.g. total household expenditure.  The Gini index is 
the ellipse-shaped area between the Lorenz Curve (Figure 1) as a proportion of the total area 
under the diagonal. It is therefore equal to one minus the area under the Lorenz Curve and ranges 
from zero (when there is complete equality and the Lorenz Curve coincides with the diagonal) to 
1 (when all income is concentrated in the hands of one person). The concentration index (C) on 
the other hand is defined in exactly the same way except that the concentration curve L(s) is used 
instead of the Lorenz curve. Both the Concentration and Gini index can be calculated by; 
 
 
Where C is the concentration or Gini index, yi is the health payments (for C) or the measure of 
living standards (for G) and Ri is the fractional rank of the living standards measure (i.e. 
expenditure.) 
 
Figure 1: Gini Coefficient (Index) 
 
 
Kakwani index of progressivity is then derived from these two indices and is twice the area 
between the concentration curve for OOP payments and the Lorenz curve. This is defined as:  
 
Kπ = C– G 
 
  
Where C is the concentration index for health payments and G is the Gini coefficient of the 
ability to pay (ATP) variable (i.e. equivalent expenditure). If OOP expenses are a progressive 
(regressive) source of financing, the concentration curve will lie below (above) the Lorenz curve, 
and Kπ will be positive (negative). If OOP payments are perfectly correlated with income, Kπ will 
be zero and the financing source will be proportional. Proportionality could also arise when these 
curves cross each other. However, while visual inspection of concentration curves, Lorenz Curve 
and the line of equality may give an impression of whether there is dominance, this may not be 
sufficient to conclude whether or not dominance is statistically significant. It is also true to say 
that concentration curves are estimated from survey data, and so may display sampling 
variability. Therefore, it is important to provide statistical tests of dominance between the curves. 
To confirm dominance of concentration curves, dominance tests to see if the concentration curve 
dominate the Lorenz curve in each year will be carried out for all the three years under analysis 
using the multiple comparison approach (MCA) decision rule, with comparisons at 19 equally 
spaced quintile points and a 5 percent significance level (O‟Donnell et al. 2008). 
 
d. Factors determining OOP payments 
Model specification 
A logistic regression will be used to assess the factors determining OOP payments. The model is 
thus specified in general as: 
iXy i  
Where, OOP payments (a binary outcome) is the dependent variable (y
*
). It is 1 if household 
OOP payments is greater than 0 (oop > 0) and a value of 0 otherwise. Independent variables (Xi) 
are defined in table 1.5.2. Additionally, α is the constant and βi the coefficients being estimated. 
e. Factors determining size of OOP payments 
Tobit model will be used to assess the factors determining the magnitude of OOP payments. This 
is because the dependent variable (oop) is limited or censored. There is a sufficiently large 
number of OOP expenditures reported as zero. For example, only about 38% of households in all 
three surveys reported positive OOP payments, the rest of the observations are zeros. For such 
limited dependent variables the Tobit model (Tobin 1958) or sample selection models are usually 
  
a preferred model of analysis compared to the usual OLS. The Tobit model like other sample 
selection models assumes a truncated or censored dependent variable and uses all observations, 
both those at the lower limit and those above it, to estimate independent effects.  
 
The intuition behind a Tobit model is such that first, we have a latent model where the dependent 
variable, say, yi*, which has some independent variables and coefficients and a disturbance term 
that is normally distributed with a mean of zero. However, we have censoring at zero. Thus we 
have an observed yi that equals yi* if the value of yi* is greater than zero, but equals zero if the 
value of the unobserved yi* is less than or equal to zero. 
The Tobit model is thus represented by: 
 
 
Where, yi* is the latent dependent variable, in this case OOP payments equal to or below zero 
(oop ≤ 0), yi is the observed dependent variable, i.e. positive OOP payments (oop > 0). Xi is the 
vector of the independent variables, same as those in table 1.5.2.  β is the vector of coefficients, 
and the εi‟s are assumed to be independently normally distributed: εi ~N(0; σ) (and therefore yi 
~N(xi β, σ).  
  
The Tobit model has been applied in many similar studies. For example, in Mugisha et al. (2002) 
in Burkina Faso to estimate OOP expenditure on health care where information was available for 
independent variables (age, sex and income) but limited for the dependent variable (OOP 
expenditure) . The Tobit model has also been applied in Taiwan to assess health expenditure for 
the elderly where a good number of health expenditures were unreported (Chi, Hsin 1999). 
Stoddard and Gray (1997) also used the Tobit model to estimate maternal smoking and medical 
expenditures for childhood respiratory illness where the analysis included a large number of 
children with no respiratory-related medical expenditures.  
In this paper, the variables used in the regression analyses are presented and described in table 2 
  
 
Table 2: Variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Variable definition and description 
Dependent variable 
 
oop 
 
Out of pocket payments (in logistic regression oop =1 if a 
household paid OOP; 0 = if not) (in Tobit regression oop is a 
continuous variable and left censored at 0) 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
hh_size 
Number of persons in a household  
 
Location 
 
Location of household (1=Rural; 0= Urban ) 
 
age_hh 
 
Age of household head in years 
 
sex_hh 
 
Sex of household head (1=Male; 0= Female) 
 
ms_hh 
 
Marital status of household head (1=Married; 0= Not married) 
 
Work_hhead 
 
Work status of household head (1= working; 0=Not working) 
 
educ_hh 
 
Maximum number of education of household head 
 
 
expenditure  
 
Household socio-economic status measured by household 
expenditure. Quantiles are in ascending order i.e. the first quantile 
also represents the sub-population with the lowest household 
expenditure. 
 
 
1.6 Ethics 
This study will be using secondary datasets. The analysis will not at all contain information on 
any single individual or household in the dataset. The data set is already coded and no individual 
or household can be identified. 
 
1.7 Logistics 
Data analysis shall commence immediately upon getting the data sets. The work plan is 
summarized in table 3 
  
Table 3: Study Time Line 
 Activity/time 
January 
2010 
February 
2010 
March 
2010 
April 
2010 
May 
2010 
June 
2010 
July 
2010 
August 
2010 
Data Analysis                 
Structured 
Literature 
review                 
Manuscript                 
Policy Brief                 
 
1.8 DISSEMINATION 
As per programme requirements, findings of this research will be presented in a manuscript of an 
article for submission to an appropriate peer reviewed journal. Additionally, an editorial/opinion 
piece/policy brief will be published. Research findings will also be presented at any appropriate 
conference(s). 
 
1.9 BUDGET 
The budget for the study is presented in table 4 
 
 
Table 4 Study Budget 
No.  
Item 
 
Description 
 
Rate 
 
Quantity 
 
Amount 
 
Total 
 
1 Transportation Inter-city bus fare from  Mansa 
to Lusaka and back( visit to 
Central statistics)  
 
Taxi within the city 
 
 
$160 
 
 
$40 
 
- 
 
- 
 
$160 
 
$40 
 
$160 
 
$40 
2 Communication  
Internet e-mailing  
Telephone/Fax 
 
$100 
$60 
 
 
- 
- 
 
$100 
$60 
 
 
 
$160 
  
4 Stationery Protocol  $0.1/page x 25pages 
 
Structured Lit Review 
$0.1/page x 35pages 
 
Manuscript $0.1/page x 
35pages 
 
Policy Brief $0.1/page x 
25pages 
 
Binding of each   
 
Data storage device    
 
Pens  
 
Pencils  
 
Writing pad  
 
Small Bag (safe keeping of all 
paper work etc) 
$2.5 
 
$3.5 
 
 
$3.5 
 
$2.5 
 
$6 
 
$70 
 
$3 
 
$3 
 
$3 
 
$15 
10 copies 
 
10 copies 
 
 
10 copies 
 
10 copies 
 
4 copies 
 
8 gigs 
 
1 packet 
 
1 packet 
 
2 
 
1 
$25 
 
$35 
 
 
$35 
 
$25 
 
$24 
 
$70 
 
$3 
 
$3 
 
$6 
 
$15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$241 
5 Other Costs miscellaneous $60 - $60 $60 
6 Grand Total     $661 
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OVERVIEW 
Low and middle income countries account for about 5.6 billion people.  In these countries, more 
than 50% of all health-care is financed directly out of pocket (World Health Organisation 2008). 
This creates barriers to accessing needed health care for families that cannot afford to pay.  It 
also exposes them to catastrophic health expenditures. Globally, out of pocket payments are 
responsible for pushing more than 100 million people annually into poverty.  This also results in 
catastrophic health expenditures (Xu et al. 2007). In Sub-Saharan Africa, out of pocket (OOP) 
payments is one of the single largest sources of health financing, forcing households to borrow or 
sell their assets in their efforts to meet health care costs thereby restricting long-term economic 
survival (McIntyre et al. 2006, Leive, Xu 2008). With the poor and marginalized segments of 
society having a greater need for health care than their rich counterparts in most cases (CSDH 
2008, Zere et al. 2007, Pannarunothai, Mills 1997), it means the poor will continue to bear the 
greatest burden of health financing especially where out of pocket payments are predominant. 
This may greatly restrict the poor from accessing health care.  
 
This paper presents a detailed review of the international literature on the assessment of the 
progressivity and determinants of out of pocket payments and brings to light methodological 
differences that exist in different studies. The review identifies some important methodological 
limitations from various studies and how these may affect study results especially in the 
assessment of progressivity of out of pocket payments. The review is divided into three sections. 
Section one provides the detailed theoretical framework regarding health care distribution.  It 
explores the meanings of equity (vertical and horizontal), background theories of equity in health 
and health care financing, and theories of distributive justice. This section also discusses the 
methodologies used in assessing progressivity in health care financing. Section two presents 
empirical studies noting the search methodology and inclusion/exclusion criteria and the results.  
This is followed by a conclusion and explanation of the limitations of the studies. Section three is 
a summary of the determinants of out of pocket payments drawn from various studies.  
 
  
 
 
 
SECTION ONE: THEORETICAL REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction  
Hurley notes that among the various “goods” that contribute to the ultimate end (happiness, 
capabilities and functions, fulfilment of a rational life plan etc), health is often accorded special 
ethical significance.  This is because it is necessary to achieving most intermediate and ultimate 
ends (Hurley 2001). Grossman (1972) made this notion clearer in his famous model. In its 
simplest form, the model postulates health as an economic commodity which consumers demand 
for two reasons; firstly, as a consumption commodity which directly enters an individual‟s 
preference functions, i.e. as an end in itself because human beings enjoy being in a state of good 
health. Ill-health is a source of disutility. Secondly, as an investment commodity that determines 
the total amount of time available for market and nonmarket activities. Therefore, if an 
individual is sick they are deprived of the time to involve in activities that will enhance their 
lives such as going to work, going to school, visiting friends, doing physical exercises, and so on. 
Grossman‟s model further points out that every individual is initially born with a stock of health 
which depreciates with time, and this stock of health can be affected by consuming market goods 
such as health care, housing, diet, recreation, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption. 
Although the model does not restrict the goods that enhance health to health care alone, health 
care has remained the main subject of focus in health economics. This is so because of the 
important role it plays in enhancing health even though it is not the sole determinant of health 
outcomes of populations. Health care is generally defined to include those goods, services and 
activities that the primary purpose is the maintenance or improvement of health (Hurley 2001). 
Because of this, Grossman described the nature of demand for health care as a „derived demand‟, 
in the sense that it is not demanded and purchased for its own sake per se, but for the good health 
that can be derived from its consumption.  
 
  
1.2 Distribution of Health Care 
1.2.1 The market as a guide in the distribution of health care 
Grossman‟s work is a great contribution to our understanding of a significant end (individual‟s 
health) that health care serves.  This link between health care and health is important in health 
economics. The Commission on the Social Determinants of Health of the World Health 
Organization adds that, without health care, many of the opportunities for fundamental health 
improvement are lost (CSDH 2008). Implying that, health care presents its consumers with 
opportunities to improve their health and lives without which they will not be able to function 
properly. Reinhardt (1989) adds that health care actually represents a very broad set of goods and 
services that spans the entire spectrum from a purely private consumption goods (say, face 
surgery), to purely social goods such as immunisation that the society wishes to make available 
to all citizens regardless of peoples‟ ability to pay. Similarly, it has been pointed out that health 
care, whether curative or preventive, is regarded as a merit good - a commodity that ought to be 
available for use by everyone irrespective of ability to pay (Mwabu 1997).  
 
However, as important as health care is, the question of how it should be distributed to afford all 
members of society a sufficient share to enhance their health is a subject of debate among 
researchers and policy makers. It is often argued that, since health care can be purchased in a 
market, its distribution should be left to market forces. On the contrary, while traditional 
microeconomic theory believes that under ideal conditions competitive markets will provide 
optimal allocative outcomes (Jan 1999), it has not been the case for health care. The assumption 
of conventional economic theory is that all things being equal, demand for goods and services 
will equalize with the supply of such services at a given time. When this is fulfilled economists 
claim that the market for such goods and services has cleared or is in equilibrium. In other 
words, all needs are met; everyone has gotten exactly what they needed, there is neither a 
shortfall nor a surplus. In terms of health care, this may mean that the amount of health care 
services that any given individual or group of people may require will be provided in the exact 
proportions as they are needed. But this is not what is usually observed in most situations 
regarding health care. Rather, what is usually observed is a situation where health care needs far 
more out-weigh health care resources.  In other words, the allocation of health care resources 
does not seem to comply with conventional economic theory. This is because unlike ordinary 
  
market goods, health care goods are said to have attributes that defeat the assumptions of 
competitive market equilibrium under which the market forces of demand and supply can 
flourish. There are many reasons for the failure of economic assumptions. Some of them include; 
information asymmetry between producers (medical professionals) and consumers (patients); 
imperfect agency relationships between patients and physicians; incomplete markets especially 
those for risk; existence of monopolies in the pharmaceutical industry as well as local 
monopolies held by hospitals. Also that much of health care has characteristics of a public good 
(Culyer 2005). These assumptions have been widely explored in most of health economics 
literature (Hurley 2001, Rice 2003).  Because of this, it is often thought that public intervention 
is necessary in the distribution of health care. In line with this, if the allocation of health care was 
left to market forces of demand and supply, those sections of society with no effective demand 
due to inadequate purchasing power may be left out no matter their need for it.  This may result 
in undesirable consequences because of the link between health care and health.  Hurley (2001) 
argues that it is therefore a matter of justice that those in ill health receive treatment based on 
their need for health care, not based on market attributes such as ability-to-pay.  
 
However, the distribution of health care cannot be said to have been just as Hurley argues. There 
is overwhelming evidence of health inequalities at both international and country level which 
result partly from unfair distribution of health care. For example, within countries there are 
dramatic differences in health, with the poorest having high levels of illness and premature 
mortality compared to their richer counterparts (CSDH 2008). These inequalities are attributed to 
a large extent to differences in access to and availability of health care. Reducing these 
inequalities and achieving justice in the distribution of health care is an important issue of health 
policy in many countries. However, while countries strive to do so, many of them are confronted 
with the question of what is actually meant by a just distribution. Many researchers have tried to 
provide answers to this question but it still remains a subject of debate among different scholars. 
Some of these debates are discussed below.  They are discussed in relation to financing and 
distribution of health care. 
 
  
1.2.2Theories of distributive justice as a guide in the distribution of health care 
Theories of distributive justice can serve as a guide in the distribution of various goods and 
services including health care. The most common of these theories, discussed in detail in the 
following sections, include utilitarianism, egalitarianism, libertarianism and the maximin. 
 
 
 
a. Utilitarianism 
According to utilitarianism, utility is at the center of every society (Rabinowciz 2000, Metz 
2003, Barry 1989, Schroth 2008). Its focus is the maximization of happiness or well-being and 
the minimization of unhappiness or pain. Utilitarianism in broad terms may include such things 
as pleasure, satisfaction, good health and being able to achieve one‟s goals in life 
(Hoedemaekers, Dekkers 2003). A just distribution is one that maximizes the aggregate utility, 
seen as the sum total of individual utilities (Schroth 2008). Therefore, in terms of health care 
financing, the need is for financing those interventions or a set of policies that will achieve the 
greatest health coverage and subsequent health outcomes for the greatest number of people. In 
this case, health care financing policies are only good so long as they maximize the total number 
of people to be covered in the population. However, it is important to understand whose utility is 
to be maximized here. For example, if it is the utility of an individual, he or she would spend all 
her or his money or resources on health care until they get maximum health (if this can be 
determined) i.e. until their marginal utility from each unit of money spent equals zero. On the 
other hand, if it is the government (depending on its utility function) it will spend all available 
resources until this is fulfilled. The bottom line is maximization of utility. 
 
Nonetheless, utilitarianism has been criticized in many ways, including the fact that its exclusive 
emphasis is on maximizing the total amount of utility at the expense of any concern, including 
how the utility is distributed among individuals (Barry 1989, Schroth 2008). For example, take 
countries where private financing (private health insurance and OOP payments) is predominant. 
As wide as the coverage for private insurance may be, the system may care less about the initial 
income of payers. This is important because if low-income households pay proportionally the 
same as high-income earners then the system becomes inequitable. The same applies for OOP 
  
payments. Utilitarians are often criticized for ignoring individual freedom (Olsen 1997). This is 
because only consequences matter.  
 
b. Egalitarianism 
Egalitarianism is in two forms namely, strong egalitarianism and Rawlsian type egalitarianism 
(Olsen 1997). In Rawlsian egalitarianism inequalities are accepted as long as they benefit the 
worst-off (or there is no way of further securing the worst-off). This is the type that is widely 
applied in health care distribution. The basic belief is that of equality of human beings and the 
creation of possibilities for people to become as equal to others as possible (Veatch 1998, 
Tsuchiya, Dolan 2009, Rawls 1971, Williams 1988). In terms of health care financing, this may 
mean equality of payments or contributions based on one‟s resources. This is also referred to as 
the egalitarian principle (Wagstaff et al. 1992).  Egalitarianism therefore aims at distributing 
access to health care according to need (Veatch 1998). Williams points out that in the egalitarian 
system of health care provision, equal opportunity of access for those in equal need should be the 
dominant ethic, and that there should be establishment of the social hierarchy of need which 
should not be linked to who is paying for the care. As such „it dictates public provision‟ of health 
care (Williams 1988). Public provision may mean financing health care by taxation and/or social 
health insurance to cover even non-payers.  
 
However, financing health care the egalitarian way has a number of policy implications. To 
begin with, tax funding and social health insurance are the most appropriate financing 
mechanisms under which the egalitarian ethic of contributing according to ability to pay but 
benefiting according to need can be applicable. It follows that those who cannot afford to pay for 
health care will shift their burden of financing to those who can afford it. In the case of tax 
funding, a country needs to have a sufficient tax base for it to generate sufficient resources to go 
round. This is possible if the formal sector is large enough. Because of this, financing health care 
the egalitarian way has been a major challenge in poor regions of the world, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa, with a large informal sector.  
 
c. Libertarianism 
  
According to this ethic, individual liberty is the fundamental and only concern of any just society 
(Narveson 1988). In this model, nothing is as important as the right to personal freedom and 
private property (Barry 1989, Rawls 1971, Narveson 1988). Proponents argue that the state 
should not interfere when citizens claim and exert these rights. If anything, its intervention 
should be minimal, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, fraud, 
enforcement of contracts, and so on (Nozick 1974). It follows from this that the libertarian would 
support a health care financing system based on the free-market principle, that is, allocation of 
health care should be left to the market forces of demand and supply-without state intervention. 
That said, willingness and ability to pay should be the dominant ethic in the liberal system of 
health care provision. Hoedemaekers and Dekkers (2003) add that in this society, every 
individual pays for his/her own individual needs, including medical needs.  These are paid for 
directly or indirectly through private health insurance and/or OOP payments. Some view access 
to health care as part of the society‟s reward system, and, at the margin at least, people should be 
able to use their income and wealth to get more or better health care than their fellow citizens 
should they so wish (Williams 1988). 
 
However, libertarianism has a number of inconsistencies which may raise important concerns as 
a way of financing health care. Since market allocation is determined by prices, private sector 
financing would deny health care to those without ability to pay. This is common in low and 
middle income countries for example where members of private insurance schemes tend to be 
small groups of people who belong to high socio-economic groups (Ataguba et al. 2009). For the 
same reason there could be a great concern for market failure which the government may need to 
correct for. In Africa the liberal theories became rampant in the early 1980s which revolutionized 
many health systems in a number of countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia to mention a 
few (Kondo, McPake 2007, Masiye et al. 2008, Nyonator, Kutzin 1999, McIntyre et al. 2008). 
The main themes of the reforms were market liberalization and privatization of economies which 
led to major changes in the way health care was financed. In the three countries mentioned above 
the reforms took the form of the involvement of the private sector in the provision and financing 
of health services, the removal of subsidies in health care, the introduction of cost sharing to pay 
for health care as well as the introduction of user fees in public health facilities. This resulted in 
reduced health care utilization due to lack of financial access to health care services. In Zambia, 
  
in some instances, patients were turned away from health facilities because they could not pay 
for services (Kondo, McPake 2007). User fees have since been abolished in Zambia in 2006 in 
order to pursue more equity-oriented health financing mechanisms (Masiye et al. 2008). In other 
countries around the world health systems are now being called upon to adopt health financing 
mechanisms that do not discriminate against users of health services based on their ability to pay.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
d. Maximin (John Rawls) 
In his book, A theory of Justice Rawls (Rawls 1971) proposes two principles of justice. The first 
principle emphasizes equality of basic or primary rights.  The second is that social and economic 
inequalities, if they exist, be (a) to the benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all. The first principle should be fulfilled if the second is to be 
realized. All people should have a fair share of primary goods. Hence, the maximin is about a 
distribution principle which maximizes well-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
being for those with the least. Rawls then proposes that if people were to enter into a social 
contract behind the veil of ignorance, that is a situation in which they were unaware of the social 
contingencies and the accidents of natural endowment, then they would unanimously choose to 
maximize the primary goods for the worst off, the reason being that each individual would not 
want to be the one to end up in this position. 
 
Harsanyi (1975) is one of the many critics of Rawls‟ theory. He criticizes Rawls‟ idea of giving 
priority to the worst-off, noting that the difference principle requires that absolute priority is 
given to the interests of the worst-off individual, even under the most extreme conditions. He 
further observes that under this ethic, even if the individual‟s interests were affected only in a 
very minor way, and all other people in society had opposite interests of the greatest importance, 
his or her interests would always override anybody else's. This may find problems of 
applicability in health care financing, because by implication resource allocation or priority 
setting in terms of administering health interventions may focus on who is least advantaged or 
has the worst health status. However, current health policies are guided partly by cost-
effectiveness assessments to determine the worth of certain health projects, and health status 
alone is not enough in determining health expenditure. Rawls has also been criticized for 
operating with a vague distribuendum (the object to distribute). According to Olsen, it is not 
  
solely income, or welfare or utility, but a composition of so-called 'primary goods'; rights and 
justice, power and opportunities, income and welfare. In addition, he argues that health is not 
included as a primary good (Olsen, 1997). 
 
In response to some of the criticisms, Rawls states that the maximin criterion is not meant to be 
applied to small-scale situations, such as say, how a doctor should treat his patients. He further 
argues that the Maximin is a macro not a micro principle (Rawls 1974). Regarding health care 
financing, the maximin principle would be difficult to apply especially in health systems where 
private financing is predominant. In this case the worst-off may actually not receive any health 
care especially if they cannot afford it. This principle can however be applicable in a progressive 
tax funded system. 
 
In summary, this section has reviewed the market as well as theories of distributive justice as 
means by which health care goods and services may be distributed. The review has also taken 
time to highlight the failed assumptions of traditional economic theory in relation to health care 
distribution. The pros and cons of the theories of justice under discussion have also been 
highlighted. Despite the highlighted shortcomings of each of the theories of distributive justice, 
this study still favors the Egalitarian theory. This is because in egalitarianism the main principle 
guiding resource distribution is equality of human beings. In terms of financing health care 
egalitarianism argues that an equitable health care financing system is one in which payments for 
health care are positively related to ability to pay (Wagstaff et al. 1992). In this theory, it is 
regarded as right and proper that persons who are able to pay more towards health care should do 
so. Progressivity studies are based on this. Progressivity studies tend to investigate how health 
care payments are related to ability to pay. It is desirable in most health systems that health care 
payments are progressive, that is, let those who have more pay more and those who have less pay 
less. This is what is referred to as equitable financing of health care. 
 
1.3 The Meaning of Equity in Health Care Financing 
The theories of justice are no doubt instrumental in guiding the way health care resources may be 
distributed. Though different, each approach seems to justify what is defined as „equitable‟. In 
health care financing the concept of equity is widely acknowledged to be an important policy 
  
objective (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer & Paq 1989), but it is at the same time a much-debated 
subject (Olsen 1997). Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) observe that while equity is accorded a 
relatively high profile by policy-makers, and though there is a relatively large academic literature 
on the subject in health care, there appears to be considerable confusion over what its meaning is 
(Wagstaff, van Doorslaer & Paq 1989, Wagstaff, van Doorslaer & Paq 1989, Culyer 2001, 
Chang 2002, Braveman, Gruskin 2003). Mooney (1983) suggests seven possible definitions of 
equity in the context of health care provision. These are briefly explained below: 
 Equality of expenditure per capita; this suggests that if budgets for health care are to be 
allocated to different regions, they should be done pro rata with the size of each region‟s 
population. 
 Equality of inputs or resources per capita; this implies that in allocating resources to 
different regions, allowance should be made for differential prices so that the resources 
which can be purchased with the allocated expenditure are the same per capita. 
 Equality of input for equal need; this implies that greater resources should be allocated to 
populations with seemingly more health needs. This can be established by examining the 
population structure. For example children, elderly and pregnant women may need more 
health resources. 
 Equality of access for equal need; this in allocating resources allowance should be made 
for the differential costs (as opposed to price) of accessing health services. For example, 
patients in rural areas normally have higher costs to bear in seeking health care (e.g. 
travelling costs) compared to those in urban areas. 
 Equality of utilization for equal need; this argues that if individuals are facing the same 
level of supply of health care, their use should be the same for equal need. 
 Equality of marginal met need; this given different regions with varying health needs, 
equity is reached if each region would stop treating the same specific need when each of 
their budgets are cut by the same amount. 
 Equality of health; this argues that the level of health should be the same in all regions 
and/or social classes. 
 
  
1.3.1Horizontal vs. Vertical equity 
The different understandings of equity in health and health care can be classified under either 
horizontal equity or vertical equity. Generally, speaking horizontal equity refers to the „equal 
treatment of equals‟ (Fleurbaey, and Maniquet 1997). In terms of health care utilization, 
horizontal equity is concerned with the extent to which, on average, persons in equal need of 
medical health services receive similar health services regardless of their income, wealth or any 
other consideration (Cisse, Luchini & Moatti 2007). In health care financing, households with 
the same ability to pay contribute the same amounts towards health financing to the extent. On 
the other hand, vertical equity is the “unequal treatment of unequals” (Langørgen 2008). When 
health care is the subject of discussion, vertical equity is concerned with the extent to which 
persons with greater medical needs are treated more favorably (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer 2000) 
while in health care financing it refers to the extent to which households of unequal ability to pay 
make appropriately dissimilar payments for health care (Cisse, Luchini & Moatti 2007). The 
latter is also referred to as the Rawlsian egalitarian principle in some health economics literature 
(Wagstaff, van Doorslaer 2001).  
 
1.3.2 Implementing Equity in Health Care Financing 
The subject of equity (vertical or horizontal) and its implementation in health care financing is 
central to most health policy objectives around the world. McIntyre and others have suggested 
that if we are to adopt a human rights perspective, a key equity principle should be that people 
should contribute to the funding of health services according to their ability to pay (McIntyre et 
al. 2007). Following this assertion, a number of policy options in health care financing have been 
suggested.  These include that financing mechanisms should be progressive (i.e. those with 
greater ability to pay should contribute a higher proportion of their income than those with lesser 
ability to pay). In addition, they suggest that financing mechanisms should provide financial 
protection.  That is, households should not be pushed into poverty after making health payments.  
 
In conclusion, this section has explored the various meanings of equity in health care financing. 
The section has also given an explanation of the two streams or types of equity, namely; 
horizontal and vertical equity. This study is based on the later. In terms of health care financing 
vertical equity is the requirement that payments are made according to one‟s ability to pay. This 
  
is the egalitarian principle on which this study is based. As is stated in the previous section, 
progressivity measurement investigates how health payments are related to ability to pay. 
Payments are progressive if those who have a greater ability to pay contribute more while those 
with lesser ability to pay contribute less to health financing. This is vertical equity in terms of 
health care financing and it is a desirable policy objective in many countries around the world. 
 
1.4 Methods of Assessing Progressivity in Health Care Financing 
It has been mentioned in the previous section that for purposes of equity, health payments should 
be related to ability to pay. By implication, rich people should pay more as a proportion of their 
total income towards health care than the poor should. Smith observes that progressivity assesses 
how much more the rich are (or could be) paying (Smith 2010). In health care financing, 
progressivity measurement investigates the extent to which payments toward health care are 
related to ability to pay. O‟Donnell et al (2008) outline two common ways of assessing whether 
health payments are progressive or not. This can be done by either taking the ratio of health 
payments to ability to pay and comparing these across varying socio-economic statuses (i.e. the 
direct method), or by using formal indices such as the concentration and Kakwani indices. 
 
1.4.1 Direct Method 
The progressivity of health care payments can be assessed directly by examining their share to 
ability to pay (ATP). The population is, for example, divided into different quintiles of socio-
economic status, (usually from poorest to the richest) of a chosen living standards measure, and 
health payments are inspected in each quintile and comparisons are made (see figure 1 below). If 
health payments increase with ATP, they are progressive but regressive if health payments 
decrease as income increases. If health payments are proportional, the ratio will remain the same 
for all income quintiles. Figure 1 below shows the case of progressive OOP payments for health 
care in Egypt in 1997. It can be observed that OOP share in expenditure rises with the quintiles 
of expenditure. 
 
Figure 1 : Assessment of the Progressivity of Out of Pocket Payments Using the Direct Method, 
Egypt, 1997. 
  
 
Source: O‟Donnell et al 2008. 
 
1.4.2 Health Payments Concentration Curves 
Progressivity can also be assessed graphically through comparison of the concentration curve of 
health payments with the Lorenz curve of the ATP. This has been used in a number of studies 
(Cisse et al 2007, Mastilica & Bozikov 1999, Smith S 2009). 
 
1.4.3 The Kakwani Index 
The use of summary indices such as the Kakwani to measure progressivity is derived from public 
finance economics, where the focus is on the relationship between various forms of taxes and 
income. A progressive tax schedule is one for which the average rate of taxation increases with 
pre-tax income (Lambert, and Hutton 1979). In health care financing, the focus is on the 
relationship between pre-payment income (the analogue of pre-tax income in the tax literature) 
and health care payments (the analogue of taxes). While there are many summary measures for 
progressivity, the Kakwani index (Kakwani 1977) has found wide application in health care 
financing. Similar to the Kakwani index is Suits index (Suits 1977) which is also based on 
Lorenz curve and relative concentration curve. The Kakwani index is defined as twice the area 
between any health care payments‟ concentration curve and the Lorenz curve of ATP. This can 
also be obtained as the difference between the concentration index of health payments and the 
  
Gini coefficient of pre-payment income. The values of the Kakwani index range from –2 to 1. A 
negative number means that health payments are regressive while a positive number indicates 
that payments are progressive. If health payments are proportional, the Kakwani index will be 
zero. The index could also be zero if the curves were to cross and positive and negative 
differences between them cancel. 
 
While this review has identified more than one method for assessing progressivity of health care 
payments, the use of summary indexes such as the Kakwani and Suits index is considered as the 
most appropriate method where this review is concerned. The same method is applied in this 
study. However, like in other similar studies, the Kakwani index has been used as a supplement 
to, and not a replacement of the more general graphical analysis (i.e. concentration curves). This 
is because there are some instances in which the index could be zero without necessarily 
implying proportionality. For example, if the curves were to cross, positive and negative 
differences between them will cancel giving the index a value of zero. This may make 
interpretations somewhat misleading. On the other hand, Graphical analysis (i.e Lorenz 
dominance analysis) alone fails to provide a measure of the magnitude of progressivity, which 
may be useful when making comparisons across time or countries. Summary indices of 
progressivity meet this deficiency. 
 
SECTION TWO: EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This section reviews empirical literature on progressivity and determinants of out of pocket 
payments from various countries. The section opens with a statement of the objectives, followed 
by the methods section. Results are presented in the section after the methods after which comes 
the discussion. 
2.2 Review Objectives 
The purpose of this empirical review is to summarize the evidence available from the literature 
with regard to out of pocket payments as a means of financing health care both globally and in 
Africa. The main focus will be assessing the progressivity of out of pocket payments as a means 
  
of health care financing. The review will highlight any existing gaps and make recommendation 
that future studies address these kinds of limitations.  
 
2.3 Methods 
This review is based on a literature search for papers and abstracts providing information, on the 
assessment of progressivity of out of pocket payments around the world. Databases used include 
PubMed, Medline, Ebscohost, and sources found using Google Scholar. The search terms 
included the combination of the words Out of Pocket payments, health care financing, equity in 
health care financing, progressivity, and regressivity. While many studies involving out of 
pocket payments were found, only those primarily investigating the relationship between out of 
pocket payments and household income or a proxy of ability-to-pay (ATP) were retained. Non-
English studies were excluded. The discussion within this review focuses on five aspects of 
progressivity measurement considered important. These are: the definition of out of pocket 
payments (i.e. what constitutes OOP payments), the measure of ability to pay, the type of data 
used and its sources,  the methods used in assessing progressivity, results and implications. 
 
2.4 Results 
The results of the review are presented in this section. A total of 49 studies were analyzed.  
These were grouped as either domestic or international. Domestic studies are defined to include 
all those studies conducted within Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1) while international studies 
include all those conducted elsewhere (Table 2). Progressivity assessment results of the studies 
are presented in table 3 
 
2.3.1 Composition of Out of Pocket Payments  
The definition of OOP payments varied across studies. For example, two studies in Africa - 
Manzi et al (2005) and Cisse, Luchini & Moatti (2007) used health related expenses such as 
transport while others did not. Different compositions of OOP payments could result in different 
incidence patterns. Another important aspect of OOP payments is expenses on traditional 
medicine. For countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries, it has become 
common for households to opt for traditional medicine as a source of medical consultation. This 
too should be included in the estimation of OOP payments. For domestic studies, only the South 
  
African and Ghanaian study included this form of expenditure (Ataguba et al. 2009). On the 
international front, composition of OOP payments depended on the level of development of the 
country. For developing countries, and countries in transition, some studies included expenditure 
on traditional medicine while others did not. Those that included traditional medicine include 
Mastilica & Bozikov (1999) for Croatia, O‟Donnell et al (2008) for Hong Kong, Nepal, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand. There was no such expenditure for all developed 
countries. Some international countries also included health related expenditures such as 
transport and food expenses in their definitions of OOP payments. These include Arredondo& 
Najera (2008) in Mexico, Abu-Zaineh et al (2008) from Palestine, Thuan et al (2006) for 
Vietnam as well as O‟Donnell et al (2008) for Nepal and Bangladesh. 
 
2.3.2 Measure of Ability to Pay (ATP) 
Household expenditure was the commonest measure of ability to pay for most domestic 
countries except in Manzi et al (2005) where asset index was used. Internationally, nearly all 
developed countries used household income to measure ATP, while most developing and 
countries in transition used household consumption and expenditure. Studies using income 
include Lairson,Hindson & Hauquitz (1995) for Australia, O'Donnell et al (2008) for Japan, 
Wagstaff et al (1992) for Britain, Denmark, Spain, France, Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, Ireland 
and the United States of America. In Ireland, Smith (2010) used both income and expenditure. 
Some studies from countries in transition such as Mexico (Arredondo, Najera 2008) , Colombia 
(Castano et al. 2002), Croatia, South Korea and Thailand (O‟Donnell et al 2008) also used 
income. A study in Thailand (Pannarunothai, Mills 1997) used level of education of household 
head as a proxy for ATP besides income. The rest of the international studies used household 
consumption and expenditure, with the exception of the Vietnam study (Thuan et al, 2006) that 
used local leaders‟ classification besides expenditure. 
 
2.3.3 Data and Sources of Data 
The data used and its sources are important in the assessment of progressivity of OOP payments 
as different sources of data are prone to different biases. Tables 1 and 2 show that, as expected, 
nearly all data was obtained from household surveys. The data used in most studies come from 
household health expenditure surveys, household living standards surveys or household income 
  
and expenditure surveys.  These surveys collect information with some variations in the 
questions including the recall periods, and composition of expenditures and direct payments for 
health care. This may result in varying results obtained.  Evidence from 43 countries show that 
fewer items in the questionnaire give a lower estimate for average health spending compared to a 
questionnaire with more items (Lu et al. 2009). The same study also found that usually, a shorter 
recall period (one-month) appears to lead to a higher mean estimate of health spending compared 
to a longer recall period (11-month) 
 
In this review, different recall periods were recorded for different studies. Perkins and others 
(2009) used a 24-month compared to a 1-month recall period used in Cisse et al (2007). Other 
domestic studies did not clearly indicate the recall period over which data was collected. For 
international studies, the recall periods ranged from two weeks in Mexico (Arredondo, Najera 
2008) to two years in Kenya and Burkina Faso (Perkins et al 2009).While studies have different 
objectives which may serve as justification for the use of different recall periods, comparison of 
OOP payments may become difficult in this case.   
 
2.3.4 Method of Assessing Progressivity 
In assessing progressivity, majority of the studies used the Kakwani index. Others used a 
combination of the Kakwani index and health payments concentration curves. Others used the 
direct method.  Based on the summary presented in tables 1 and 2,  seven (7) studies used the 
direct method (Pannarunothai, Mills 1997, Arredondo, Najera 2008, Ruger, Kim 2007, Galbraith 
et al. 2005, Falkingham 2004, Hotchkiss et al. 1998, Thuan et al. 2006), five (5) used the 
Kakwani index of progressivity (Smith 2010, Castano et al. 2002, Yu, Whynes & Sach 2008, 
Abu-Zaineh et al. 2008, Lairson, Hindson & Hauquitz 1995, Mastilica, Bozikov 1999), twelve 
(12) mainly from Asia used both Kakwani and concentration index (O'Donnell 2008).  Seven (7) 
studies used Kakwani index with concentration curves (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer & Paq 1989, 
Cisse, Luchini & Moatti 2007, Smith 2010) and eight (8), mainly from developed countries used 
a combination of Kakwani and Suits index (Wagstaff et al. 1992). Only 1 study from India used 
only concentration curves (Garg, Karan 2009). For those studies that used concentration curves 
to reach their conclusions, none performed dominance tests of the Lorenz and health payments 
concentration curves.  
  
 
Table 3 shows the results, a brief conclusion and the basis for the progressivity or regressivity 
found in each study. OOP payments were progressive in sixteen (16) countries. Majority of these 
are from Asia with only one (1) country each from Europe and Africa. These are Spain and 
Tanzania respectively. However, the results for Tanzania changed afterwards and became 
regressive as shown by Ataguba et al (2009) in a later study. Furthermore, results for the 
Colombian study produced a mixed picture of progressive and regressive trends in OOP 
payments. When income was used as a measure of ATP, Kakwani indices showed a constant 
trend of regressive payments (–0.126 in 1984, to –0.3498 in 1997), but the trend moved towards 
progressivity (–0.0092 in 1984, to 0.0026 in 1997) when expenses were used. In the remaining 
29 countries, OOP payments were regressive. This include eight (8) countries from sub-Saharan 
Africa, eleven (12) from Europe, 6 from Asia, and 2 from North America (Mexico and USA). 
OOP payments were also regressive in Australia. 
 
3.0 Discussion 
Out of pocket (OOP) payments still remain one of the single largest sources of health care 
financing in Sub-Saharan Africa. This review has demonstrated that this form of health financing 
is regressive in most countries around the world. There are various reasons for the results 
obtained in each country. 
 
The review showed that results from 29 countries were regressive. These include 10 countries 
from sub-Saharan Africa. They are Tanzania, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Kenya, Senegal, Guinea and Mali. All these countries have a similar health care financing 
background which contributed to the overall results. In all of these countries, some forms of cost 
sharing policies are present ((Ataguba et al. 2009, Cisse, Luchini & Moatti 2007, Perkins et al. 
2009). At public facilities, user fees tended to increase the incidence of OOP payments. Where 
user fees were implemented side by side with fee exemptions and waiver mechanisms, most 
studies show that these were usually ineffective leaving the poor to face the same health 
payments as the rich. Some countries such as Tanzania and Ghana had some form of social 
health insurance but these were just in the early stages and could not cover provide 
comprehensive cover. OOP payments were also regressive in many international countries for 
  
various reasons. For example, in Ireland and the Netherlands in 1987 co-payments were required 
because the cover was not comprehensive (Wagstaff et al. 1992). In Ireland, persons in the top 
62% of the income distribution were required to pay for GP visits and prescription drugs in full, 
while in the Netherlands much of the expenditures associated with OOP payments were incurred 
by the privately insured in the upper half of the income distribution having insurance policies 
with substantial deductibles or excluding primary care (ibid). In Switzerland and the U.S.A 
(ibid), regressive payments stemmed from the fact that - with the exception of Medicaid enrolees 
and some privately insured in the U.S.A – co-payments are made by all irrespective of their 
income. In Australia, OOP payments were regressive because besides a national insurance 
scheme, OOP are still found in Medicare systems and these tend to be regressive (Lairson, 
Hindson & Hauquitz 1995). In Korea Republic, payments were not related to ability to pay for 
services not covered by social health insurance. Further, co-payments exist in the National 
Health Insurance (NHI) (Ruger, Kim 2007). In Palestine (Abu-Zaineh et al. 2008), regressive 
OOP payments can be attributed to the presence of government health insurance scheme 
covering only 30% of the population and private health insurance covering a tiny proportion of 
the population. OOP accounted for the largest share of health expenditure (40.5%). This implies 
that the larger population not covered by either form of health insurance paid OOP leading to 
uniform health payments across the board irrespective of differences in income of the population. 
 
Spain, Malaysia, Nepal and Punjab are some of the countries in which OOP payments were 
progressive (Wagstaff et al. 1992, Yu, Whynes & Sach 2008, O'Donnell 2008). In Spain, the 
reasons are that the health system is largely financed by social insurance with some significant 
OOP and general taxes. In Malaysia, there was a switch to private health services by the rich and 
a predominant reliance on subsidized public health services by the poor. Hence, the poor made 
fewer OOP payments compared to the rich. In Nepal, both the poor and the rich use public 
facilities. However, public facilities tend to prescribe expensive medicines not found at public 
health facilities for the rich and cheap ones for the poor. But even when prescriptions are made 
for the poor they usually do not buy due to issues of affordability. This makes OOP payments 
appear progressive.  In Hong Kong, the government had adopted a tax, rather than a social 
insurance financing mechanism. Hence, there was a substantial positive discrimination in favor 
  
of the worse-off who could not pay for health care as much as the better-off (O'Donnell et al. 
2008). 
  
In India OOP constituted the largest share of health expenditure and varied between 70-80% of 
health expenditure and 95% of private health expenditure. Insurance and community financing 
emerging at the time were weak. The pattern of OOP payments across quintile groups was 
examined only in the four states of Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, which have very 
high levels of OOP expenditure (Garg, Karan 2009). OOP payments were progressive in these 
states. The reason given is that public spending on health is generally very low while private 
spending is high leaving all households, poor and rich to face similar health costs. For example, 
per capita private spending on health in Kerala, Haryana and Punjab was four times higher than 
that in Rajasthan and three times that in Bihar. OOP expenditure in Kerala was high and 
progressive because of higher expenditure on institutional care (mostly accessible by richer 
households) and on lifestyle diseases such as heart conditions (ibid).  
 
4.0 Conclusion 
This review has identified very important limitations in the assessment of progressivity of OOP 
payments. Firstly, the comparability of studies done in different countries is made difficult by a 
lack of uniformity in the definition of what should constitute OOP payments. The major issue is 
whether OOP payments should include health related expenses such as transport, nutrition and 
patient care. While these are part of the cost of illness, their computation is always a challenge 
given the diverse approaches households may employ to meet such needs. In terms of transport 
for example, it can be argued that for places where transport is readily available as may be the 
case for many developed countries computations can be easier.  A good number of studies 
reviewed included such costs while others did not. In the same way it has become common for 
populations in developing and countries in transition to use traditional medicine as another 
option when seeking care. Hence, it is expected that countries of this type include health 
expenditures on traditional medicine. A good number of studies from developing and transition 
countries did not include this type of OOP expenditures making conclusions and comparisons 
again difficult.  
 
  
Secondly, while it is recommended by the World Bank (Grosh, Glewwe 2000) for developing 
countries and countries in transition to use consumption and expenditure in measuring household 
ATP instead of income, some countries belonging to this category still used income. There are a 
number of reasons for this recommendation. According to the World Bank (ibid), compared to 
consumption and expenditure, income is a much more sensitive topic to ask people about. 
Respondents may have an incentive to understate their income in a survey interview, especially 
if they fear that the information may be used for tax purposes despite assurances to the contrary. 
This is due to the significant importance of self-employment income (which is easier to 
understate than wage income) in developing and transition countries. Secondly, respondents may 
genuinely not know how much income they make, especially in their self-employment activities 
which are common for households in developing and transition countries. There is also a general 
absence of written accounts for household production activities. Another reason is that 
respondents may not feel the need to report their most casual or infrequent income earning 
activities. This is worsened if certain income earning activities are dubious or illegal such as sale 
of prohibited drugs. It is also true that respondents do not easily reveal their receipt of transfers 
and other non-labor income. Only one study by Manzi et al (2005) used asset index as a proxy 
for ATP. This has its own advantages and disadvantages. O‟Donnell et al (2008) observe that 
this approach has the considerable merit of requiring only data that can be easily and quickly 
collected in a single household interview and, although lacking somewhat in theoretical 
foundations, can provide a convenient way to summarize the living standards of a household. 
Nevertheless, the use of asset index may either over-estimate or under-estimate the living 
standards of a household. In the first instance, households may own the same assets over a 
number of years and may appear to be wealthy even when they no longer have the purchasing 
power to acquire the same assets in the present. In the second instance some people may not even 
own a single asset but may have greater purchasing power than those who have assets even if the 
value of those assets cannot measure to the value of the real income owned by others. Following 
this, it should be mentioned here that these measures of ability to pay should measure a distinct 
but related latent variable, that is, a long-term command over resources (O‟Donnell et al, 2008).  
 
Thirdly, most studies relied on household survey data to collect information. While this is 
common, some recall periods where rather too long for respondents to give accurate estimates of 
  
OOP payments. With evidence that shorter recall period such as 1 month produce higher 
estimates of health spending compared to longer recall periods (Lu et al. 2009), future studies 
and surveys should seek to use shorter recall periods. This is better as respondents can easily 
remember health payments that took place in the near past; say 1 month rather than 2 years. In 
terms of international best practices Deaton and Zaidi (1999) state that data on 
purchases/expenditures of non food items are often collected for different recall periods, for 
example over the past 30 days, the past 3 months, or the past 12 months, depending on how 
frequently the items concerned are typically purchased. Following this, O‟Donnell et al (2008) 
observes that health services that have a higher frequency of utilization, such as ambulatory care, 
use the recall period in the range of 2 to 4 weeks while those with a lower frequency of 
utilisation such as inpatient care, the recall period is typically 12 months. This is has been 
applied in a number of studies (Arredondo, Najera 2008, Falkingham 2004, Garg, Karan 2009) 
 
Fourthly, the choice of method for assessing progressivity of health payments differed from 
country to country. This can be another cause for difficulties in making conclusions. Studies 
using direct methods and concentration curves alone to assess progressivity of health payments 
should employ summary indices to provide the extent of progressivity and regressivity. The use 
of concentration curves should also be accompanied with dominance tests. No single study of 
those using concentration curves provided for this. 
 
In summary, this review has found that OOP payments are regressive in most of the countries 
reviewed. The review has also highlighted the limitations encountered in assessing progressivity 
of OOP payments and how this may affect comparability of findings of different studies. Future 
studies should take these limitations into consideration to make local and international 
comparisons of findings easier. 
 
SECTION THREE: DETERMINANTS OF OUT OF POCKET PAYMENTS 
3.1 Determinants of Out of Pocket Payments 
The previous sections have demonstrated that out of pocket is a significant source of health care 
financing in Africa. However, not all households and indeed individuals in this part of the world 
may make this form of payments for health care. Research has shown that there are various 
  
characteristics associated with households or individuals who make out of pocket payments. This 
is the purpose of this section. In other words, this section will analyze the characteristics of 
individuals or households who make out of pocket payments for health care. This information is 
drawn from various studies and countries including those outside of Africa and is important for 
policy making. 
Feldstein (1988) suggests that expenditures for health care are determined by three factors: price 
(e.g. cost of medicines, consultation etc.), household income (i.e. ability to pay), and preference 
shifters, such as age and education. Main of the determinants of out of pocket payments 
reviewed under this section fall under these three categories. In Rubin and Koellin (1993), 
several factors or characteristics of households likely to incur OOP health care payments have 
been identified. Among them are household income, age and education of household head, size 
of the household as well as health insurance status of the household. Others are housing tenure, 
household assets, race and welfare status of a household. Most of these factors apply in most of 
African countries. The results for the same study also showed that single headed households had 
the lowest OOP spending while white and high income households including those with higher 
education incurred higher levels of medical expenses than lower income and non-white 
households. The same was true for the less educated.  On the other hand, housing tenure and 
household welfare status were negatively related to OOP expenditure. Contrary to the 
expectations of the authors that ownership of insurance will lead to low OOP, the insurance 
parameter was positive. In another study, Hong and Kim (2000) add that the rate of increase of 
out of pocket health care expenses varies across demographic groups. They further note that 
households headed by individuals under age 25 spent less on health care, as a percentage of all 
expenses. On the contrary elderly households spent a higher proportion of their income for health 
care than the non-elderly. Rural families also devoted a larger share of their budgets to health 
care than did urban households. Ruger and Kim (2007) further suggest that the number of 
chronic conditions, insurance type, health care use, and health care facility type are also 
associated with out-of-pocket spending. Particularly, presence of chronic conditions, high 
frequent health care use, lack of insurance and use of private facility were associated with 
increased out of pocket spending. In Tajikistan, Habibov (2009) also note that an increase in 
ability to pay, being female and using specialized healthcare facilities increases the amount of 
  
out-of-pocket expenditures. In Nigeria Onwujekwe et al (2010) adds that the better-off groups in 
terms of socio-economic status more than worse-off groups used OOP to pay for healthcare.  
 
The determinants of out of pocket payments in different countries as shown in the studies 
reviewed are closely related. Table 4 summarizes a number of studies from different countries 
and the determinants of out of pocket payments in each particular study.  
 
In Taiwan Chu et al (2005) highlights that an individual who was older, female, married, 
unemployed, better educated, richer, head of a larger family household, or living in the central 
and eastern areas was more likely to have greater household out-of-pocket medical expenditures. 
This shows that age, sex, marital status, employment status and level of education of an 
individual determines whether one is able to make out of pocket payments or not. Other factors 
as demonstrated by Chu et al are household size and location of household.  
  
Table 1: Progressivity of out of pocket payments: Domestic Countries 
Study, Country & 
year published 
Country  OOP composition ATP measure  Data sources Recall 
period 
Method 
Manzi et al 2005  Tanzania -Consultation fees, cost of 
drugs, & health related 
expenses (travel & supplies) 
Asset index, 
education/occupation 
1999 & 2002 
household surveys 
Not stated  
Direct 
Akazili et al 2009  Tanzania All medical expenditure Consumption 
expenditure 
Tanzania Household 
Budget Survey, 
2000/01) 
Not stated Direct 
Akazili et al 2009  Ghana All medical expenses and 
traditional healers, but no 
health related expenses 
Consumption 
expenditure 
Ghana Living 
Standards Survey, 
2005/06), 
Not stated Direct 
Akazili et al 2009  South 
Africa 
All medical expenses and 
traditional healers, but no 
health related expense 
Consumption 
expenditure 
Income and 
Expenditure Survey, 
2005/06) 
Not  stated 
 
Direct 
Perkins et al 2009  Burkina 
Faso 
Costs of drugs and supplies, 
fees (bed, lab, professional 
fees, etc) 
household 
expenditure/income 
Population based 
surveys 2003/6 
24 months 
for all 
delivery 
costs 
Direct 
Perkins et al 2009  Kenya Costs of drugs and supplies, 
fees (bed, lab, professional 
fees, etc) 
household 
expenditure/income 
Population based 
surveys 2003 & 2006 
24 months 
for all 
delivery 
costs 
Direct  
Perkins et al 2009  Tanzania Costs of drugs and supplies, 
fees (bed, lab, professional 
fees, etc) 
household 
expenditure/income 
Population based 
surveys 2003 & 2006 
24 months 
for all 
delivery 
costs 
Direct 
Ciss´e et al 2007  Ivory 
Coast 
Consultations fees, 
medicines 
(including self-medication) 
and laboratory tests 
expenditures. Including 
Household 
consumption 
expenditure 
Primary Sampling 
Unit  household 
survey 
1 month 
for both 
inpatient 
and out 
patient 
Kakwani 
index & 
concentration 
curves  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Progressivity of out of pocket payments, International Countries 
transport costs costs 
Ciss´e et al 2007  Guinea Consultations fees, 
medicines 
(including self-medication) 
and laboratory tests 
expenditures. Including 
transport costs 
Household 
consumption 
expenditure 
Primary Sampling 
Unit  household 
survey 
1 month 
for both 
inpatient 
and 
outpatient 
costs 
Kakwani 
index & 
concentration 
curves 
Ciss´e et al 2007  Senegal Consultations fees, 
medicines 
(including self-medication) 
and laboratory tests 
expenditures. Including 
transport costs 
Household 
consumption 
expenditure 
Primary Sampling 
Unit  household 
survey 
1 month 
for both 
inpatient 
and 
outpatient 
costs 
Kakwani 
index & 
concentration 
curves 
Ciss´e et al 2007  Mali Consultations fees, 
medicines and laboratory 
tests expenditures. Including 
transport costs 
Household 
consumption 
expenditure 
Primary Sampling 
Unit  household 
survey 
1 month 
for both 
inpatient 
and 
outpatient 
costs 
Kakwani 
index & 
concentration 
curves 
Study & year  
 
Country 
 
OOP composition 
 
ATP measure 
 
Data sources Recall period 
 
Method 
  
Arredondo & 
Najera 2008  
Mexico  Travel costs, financial costs 
of care, cost of drugs and 
costs of laboratory tests, 
other 
Annual household 
income 
Mexican 
National health 
survey 
2 weeks for 
outpatient & 1 
year for 
inpatient 
 
Direct method 
Abu-Zaineh et al  Palestine Doctors‟ consultation fees, 
hospitalization costs, 
laboratory tests, 
medications, and 
transportation costs, 
Household 
expenditures 
Palestinian 
Household 
Health 
Expenditure 
Survey 2004 
1 month for 
both inpatient 
and outpatient 
 
Kakwani index 
Castano et al 2002  Colombi
a Medical expenditure Cash Income/ 
household 
expenditure 
Income & 
expenses 
surveys, 
quality of life 
surveys 
30 days and last 
1 month for all 
OOP payments 
inpatient and 
outpatient 
Kakwani index 
Mastilica & 
Bozikov 1999  
Croatia Over the counter drugs, 
private practice, traditional 
medicines, gifts & gratuities 
Cash income OOP health 
expenditure 
survey 1994 
Zagreb & Split 
(urban) 
6 months for 
both inpatient 
and outpatient 
costs 
Kakwani index 
Ruger & Kim 2007  South 
Korea 
Direct inpatient & 
outpatient payments to 
hospital & other facilities 
Household 
income(adjusted  
for household 
composition 
Korean 
National 
Health & 
Nutrition 
survey 1998 
2 weeks for 
outpatient and 1 
year for 
inpatient costs  
Direct method 
Galbraith et al  USA Cost of  medical provider 
visits, non-physician 
services, hospital inpatient 
stays, emergency room 
services, dental visits, home 
health care, prescription 
medications 
Income(sum of 
individual 
household 
members) 
Medical 
Expenditure 
Panel survey, 
2001 
 
Over a period of 
2 years 6months 
for both 
inpatient and 
outpatient 
Direct 
  
Smith S 2009 Ireland Doctor prescribed and non-
prescribed medicines and 
other medical goods 
expenditure. 
Equivalised gross 
income & 
expenditures 
Household 
Budget Survey 
1987/88, 
1999/2000, 
2004/05 
1 year for both 
inpatient and 
outpatient costs 
Concentration 
curve  and 
Kakwani index 
Pannarunothai' & 
Mills 1997  
Thailand 
 
 
 
 
All health expenditure 
Household 
income & 
educational level 
of household 
heads 
Household 
health 
interview 
survey, 
1 year for both 
inpatient and 
outpatient costs 
Direct method 
Yu et al 2008  Malaysia Expenditure on 
pharmaceutical products, 
therapeutic appliances & 
equipments, medical & 
dental services, & hospital 
services & treatments 
 
Consumption and 
adjusted for 
household size 
 
Household 
Expenditure 
Survey 
1998/99 
1 year for both 
inpatient and 
outpatient costs 
Kakwani index 
Falkingham J 2004  Tajikista
n 
Official payments  
Informal gifts (inc. money)  
Cost of travel to 
consultation  
Prescription medication 
Other medicine 
Household 
expenditure 
adjusted for 
household size 
Tajikistan 
Living 
Standard 
Survey, 
6 months for 
chronic illness, 
2 weeks for 
outpatient and 1 
year for 
inpatients costs 
Direct method 
Gag and Karan 
2008  
India Purchase of drugs and 
medicines; expenditure 
incurred on clinical tests. 
professional fees of doctors, 
nurses etc.; payments to 
hospitals and nursing homes 
for medical treatment; 
family planning appliances. 
Consumption 
expenditure 
Consumer 
Expenditure 
Survey 1999–
2000 
1 year for 
institutional care 
and  30 days for 
non-institutional 
care 
Concentration 
curves 
Thuan et al 2006  Vietnam Fees (for consultations, Total household Household 1 month for Direct method 
  
tests, x-rays, drugs and 
beds) as well as non-
medical expenses (for 
travel, food and other 
related means 
expenditure, local 
leaders 
classification  
survey 2001-
2002 
both inpatient 
and outpatient 
Hotchkiss et al 
1998  
Nepal Travel and consultation 
costs of chronic and non-
chronic illnesses, injuries 
and birth deliveries 
Total household 
expenditure per 
capita 
Nepal Living 
Standards 
Survey, 1996 
1 month for 
both inpatient 
and outpatient 
Direct method 
Lairson et al 1995  Australia Physician consultations, 
both GP and specialists, and 
hospital outpatient and 
inpatient services 
Income National 
Health Survey,  
Not clear Kakwani index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Banglade
sh 
Consultation fees, 
hospital/clinic charges, 
medicines, 
test/investigation, transport, 
tips and other health service 
charges  
Consumption  
 
Household 
Income 
Expenditure 
Survey 1999-
2000 
1 year ,but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
China Inpatient, outpatient, 
medicines, etc  
 
Consumption  
 
Sub-sample of 
Urban/ Rural 
Household 
Survey 2000 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Hong 
Kong 
Outpatient, inpatient, 
medicines, traditional 
medicine, dental, medical 
supplies/equipment, health 
supplement, other health 
care.  
Expenditure  
 
Household 
Expenditure 
Survey 1999-
2000 
1 month, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
  
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Japan Outpatient, inpatient, 
medicines and any co-
payments.  
 
Income Comprehensiv
e survey of 
living 
conditions  
1998, Health 
care survey, 
2000 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Korea 
Republic 
Inpatient, outpatient, 
medicines, dental, medical 
supplies, tests.  
Expenditure  
 
Urban 
Household 
Survey, 2000 
1 month, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Inpatient, outpatient, 
medicines, dental, acute 
care.  
 
Expenditure  
 
Household 
Budget Survey  
, 2000/01 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Nepal Consultation fees (modern 
& traditional), medicines 
(modern & traditional), 
hospital expenses, tests.  
Consumption  Living 
Standards 
Survey , 1995-
96 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Philippin
es 
Fees, hospital charges and 
medicines (modern & 
traditional ) 
 
Consumption  
 
Poverty 
Indicator 
Survey , 1999, 
Family Income 
& Expenditure 
Survey, 1994 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Punjab Outpatient, inpatient and 
medicines  
Consumption  
 
Consumer 
expenditure 
survey  1999-
1 month, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
  
2000 inpatient or 
outpatient 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Sri 
Lanka 
Fees, hospital charges, 
medicines, tests, spectacles, 
dental, homeopathy and 
acupuncture, charms and 
others  
Consumption  
 
Consumer 
Finance 
Survey 1996-
97 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Taiwan Inpatient, outpatient, 
medicines, medical 
equipment, dental, nursing 
home, tests, traditional 
medicines, medical supplies  
 
Expenditure  
 
Survey of 
Family Income 
and 
Expenditure  
 2000 
1 year, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Indonesi
a 
Outpatient, inpatient & self-
treatment medicines  
Consumption  
 
Socioeconomic 
Survey ,2001 
1 month, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
O‟Donnell et al 
2005  
Thailand Inpatient, outpatient, 
medicines, self-medication, 
traditional medicine 
Consumption  
 
Socio-
economic 
Survey 2002 
1 month, but not 
clearly stated if 
this is for 
inpatient or 
outpatient 
Concentration 
and Kakwani 
index 
Wagstatf, van 
Doorslaer, & Paci 
1989  
Britain Costs of general practitioner 
consultations, days in 
hospital,  and visits to 
hospital as an outpatient 
Equivalised Pre-
tax income 
National 
Household 
Survey, 1981 
Not stated Concentration 
curve and 
Kakwani index 
Wagstatf, van 
Doorslaer, & Paci 
1989  
Netherla
nds 
Costs of the number of 
general practitioner 
consultations, number of 
specialist consultations, and 
Pre-tax income Household 
Expenditure 
Survey, 1984 
Not stated Concentration 
curve and 
Kakwani index 
  
number of days in hospital 
Wagstatf, van 
Doorslaer 1992,  
Denmark Co-payments for  
prescription drugs, dental 
care, physiotherapy 
Pre-tax income Household 
Expenditure 
Survey, 1981 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
Spain Prescription medicines, 
Payments to private sector 
for some services available 
in public sector and for 
other services 
Pre-tax income Family budget 
survey 1980 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
France Cost of physician visits, 
medicines and inpatient care 
Pre-tax income Family 
expenditure 
survey 1984 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Ireland Co-payments for inpatient 
and outpatient treatment, 
payment for GP visits & 
prescription medicines. co-
payment for inpatient hotel 
facilities, and payment in 
full for consultant services, 
outpatient and primary care, 
and prescription medicines 
Pre-tax income Household 
budget survey 
1987 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Portugal Co-payments to public 
sector for consultations, 
diagnostic tests and 
medicines. Direct payments 
to private sector by those 
with and without 
private/occupational 
insurance 
Pre-tax income Family income 
and 
expenditure 
survey 1981 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Switzerla
nd 
Persons with basic sick fund 
cover face 10% coinsurance 
for ambulatory care  and 
Pre-tax income socio-medical 
indicators for 
the population 
Not stated Kakwani & 
Suits index 
  
 
95% of dental care  of Switzerland, 
1982 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992 
Italy Prescription drugs, Direct 
payments to private sector 
by persons with and without 
private insurance 
Pre-tax income Family 
consumption 
survey 1987 
Not stated  
Kakwani & 
Suits index 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
USA Co-payments for inpatient 
and primary care payable 
by the privately insured and 
Medicare enrollees 
Pre-tax income National 
medical care 
utilization and 
expenditure 
survey 
Not stated  
Kakwani & 
Suits index 
  
Table 3: Progressivity and Basis for Progressivity for All Studies 
Study & Year 
Published 
Country Survey 
Year 
Results Conclusion Basis for 
Progressivity/Regressivity 
Manzi et al 2005  Tanzania 1999/200
2 
OOP increase with socio-
economic status. The least poor 
pay 2.5 times more than the 
poorest 
Progressive Presence of user fees and 
incomplete implementation 
of exemption and waiver 
mechanisms 
Ataguba et al 2009  Tanzania 2000/01 OOP high and regressive Regressive Cost sharing policies- user 
fees leading to high 
incidence of OOP 
payments, social health 
insurance only in 
developing stages-not 
comprehensive 
Ataguba et al 2009  Ghana 2005/06 OOP high and regressive Regressive Cost sharing policies- user 
fees leading to high 
incidence of OOP 
payments, social health 
insurance only in 
developing stages-not 
comprehensive 
Ataguba et al 2009  South 
Africa 
2005/06 OOP mildly regressive Regressive Strong presence of private 
financing (private medical 
insurance and OOP)poor 
exposed to the same health 
costs 
Perkins et al 2009  Burkina 
Faso 
2003/200
6 
Women in the poorest wealth 
quintile did not pay 
significantly less for maternity 
costs than the wealthiest women 
Regressive Cost sharing policies were 
in place - user fees 
Perkins et al 2009  Kenya 2003/200
6 
Women in the poorest wealth 
quintile did not pay 
Regressive Cost sharing policies were 
in place-user fees 
  
significantly less for maternity 
costs than the wealthiest women 
Prkins et al 2009  Tanzania 2003/200
6 
Women in the poorest wealth 
quintile did not pay 
significantly less for maternity 
costs than the wealthiest women 
Regressive Cost sharing policy in place 
but maternity care provided 
free of charge 
Cisśe et al 2007  Ivory 
Coast 
1998-99 Kakwani index = -0.15 Regressive User fees and cost recovery 
policies introduced a year 
before the study 
Cisśe et al 2007  Guinea 1998-99 Kakwani index = -0.22 Regressive User fees and cost recovery 
policies introduced a year 
before the study 
Cisśe et al 2007  Senegal 1998-99 Kakwani index = -0.52 Regressive User fees and cost recovery 
policies introduced a year 
before the study 
Cisśe et al 2007  Mali 1998-99 Kakwani index = -0.08 Regressive User fees and cost recovery 
policies introduced a year 
before the study 
O‟Donnell et al 2008 Egypt  1997 Kakwani index = 0.0644 Progressive  OOP(user fees) largest 
source of health revenue, 
Arredondo & Najera 
2008  
Mexico   Inverse relationship of costs of 
transport, seeking care in 
private sector, with income 
-poor pay more for  medicines 
Regressive Mexican health reform 
offers public insurance to 
all citizens. However, the 
uninsured poor pay more 
for medicines 
Abu-Zaineh et al  Palestine 2004 Kakwani index = -0.0830 Regressive  Government health 
insurance scheme covering 
30% of the population. 
Private health insurance 
covers a tiny proportion of 
the population. OOP 
accounts for 40.5% of 
health expenditure 
  
Castano et al 2002  Colombia 1984/85 
1994/95 
1997 
Kakwani indices showed a 
constant trend (–0.126 in 1984, 
to –0.3498 in 1997) when using 
income, but a trend towards 
progressivity (–0.0092 in 1984, 
to 0.0026 in 1997) when using 
expenses 
Regressive/
Progressive  
Presence of two social 
insurance schemes. One for 
the poor and another for the 
rich by 2000. 
Mastilica & Bozikov 
1999  
Croatia 1994 Persons from the low income 
group paid about 6 times larger 
share of their income than the 
high income group. 
Regressive  There is social health 
insurance but reductions in 
public health care resources 
led to introduction of Cost 
sharing & privatisation 
policies 
Ruger & Kim 2007  Republic 
of Korea 
 
1998 
Lowest quintile spent 12.5% of 
total income. 
Highest quintile spent 2%.  
Low income chronically ill 
spent 20% of income compared 
to 4% by high income 
counterparts 
Regressive  Payments not related to 
ability to pay for uncovered 
services 
Presence of co-payments in 
National Health insurance 
-No cap on cost-sharing 
rates 
 
Galbraith et al  USA 2001 Quintile 1 pay $119/$1000, 
quintile 2, $66.3/$1000 
compared to quintile 3, 
$37.75/$1000 
Regressive  -covered services are 
limited(poor are under 
insured) 
-lack of dental and 
prescription drug coverage 
Smith S 2009 Ireland 1987/88,
1999/200
0, 
2004/200
5 
Kakwani index = -0.06, -0.10 & 
-0.11 for 1988, 2000 & 2005 
respectively 
Regressive   -only card holders are 
eligible for free care 
-poor cannot afford 
supplementary insurance 
Pannarunothai & Mills 
1997  
Thailand 2002 Underprivileged families spent 
OOP as much as 5-6% of their 
Regressive  -lower income families 
without health benefit or 
  
household income on health 
care whereas other groups spent 
1-2% 
low income card 
-user fees for uninsured 
Yu et al 2008  Malaysia 1989/99 Kakwani index = 0.1043 Progressive  switch to private health 
services by the rich 
&  predominant reliance on 
subsidized public health 
services by the poor  
Falkingham J 2004  Tajikistan 1999 As percentage of income, 
poorer patients paid relatively 
more for all services 
Regressive  Burden of financing health 
care shifted from public to 
individuals. 60% of health 
expenditure is from private 
sources 
Gag and Karan 2008  India 1999/200
0 
Poor quintiles spend a relatively 
lower proportion of their 
expenditure OOP than rich  
Progressive  OOP constitute the largest 
share of health expenditure 
vary between 80-70% of 
health expenditure and 95% 
of private. 
There is a weak insurance 
and community financing 
emerging. The poor spend 
more on drugs than 
inpatient compared to the 
rich 
Thuan et al 2006  Vietnam 2001/200
2 
The poor pay a larger share of 
their curative health expenditure 
compared to the rich 
Regressive  The new economic policies 
implemented  in 1986 has 
led to increase in OOP 
health expenditures (user 
fees) 
Hotchkiss et al 1998  Nepal 1996 OOP proportion of ATP from 
first to last quartile is 3.2%, 
4.6%, 6.7%, and 7.8% 
Progressive  Both poor and rich use 
public facilities 
-public facilities prescribe 
expensive medicines for the 
  
rich and cheap ones for the 
poor. Also the poor cannot 
buy prescribed medicines 
Lairson et al 1995  Australia  Kakwani index = -0.15 Regressive  Despite there being a 
national insurance scheme 
OOP are found in Medicare 
systems and these tend to be 
regressive 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Banglades
h 
1999/200
0 
Kakwani index = 0.2192 Progressive  Health is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and 
tax revenues 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  China 2000 Kakwani index = -0.0168 Regressive  Combination of social 
insurance and out of pocket 
payments-insurance for 
state workers and low 
earnings workers.  
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Hong 
Kong 
1999/200
0 
Kakwani index = 0.0113 Progressive  Adoption of a tax, rather 
than a social insurance, 
model of financing. Engage 
in substantial positive 
discrimination in favor of 
the worse-off 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Japan 1998/200
0 
Kakwani index = -0.2691 Regressive  Collects more than half of 
health funds from social 
insurance-Significant social 
insurance systems 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Korea 
Republic 
2000 Kakwani index = 0.0124 Progressive  Collects half of its finances 
from direct payments-rest 
from social insurance 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2000/01 Kakwani index = -0.0520 Regressive  Health is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and 
tax revenues- burden of 
finance evenly split 
  
between OOP taxes 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Nepal 1995/96 Kakwani index = 0.0533 Progressive  Health is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and 
tax revenues-but rely more 
heavily on OOP 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Philippine
s 
1994/199
9 
Kakwani index = 0.1391  Progressive  Modest contributions from 
insurance 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Punjab 1999/200
0 
Kakwani index = 0.0461 Progressive  Health is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and 
tax revenues- burden of 
finance evenly split 
between OOP and taxes 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Sri Lanka 1996/97 Kakwani index = 0.0687  Progressive  Health is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and 
tax revenues-burden of 
finance evenly split 
between OOP and taxes 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Taiwan 2000 Kakwani index = -0.0780  Regressive  Collects more than half of 
health funds from social 
insurance-Significant social 
insurance systems 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Indonesia 2001 Kakwani index = 0.1761  Progressive  Modest contributions from 
insurance 
O‟Donnell et al 2005  Thailand 2002 Kakwani index = 0.0907  Progressive  Private and social insurance 
mixed 
Wagstatf, van 
Doorslaer, & Paci 
1989  
Netherlan
ds 
1987 Kakwani index = -0.059 Regressive  Rely heavily on 
(compulsory) social 
insurance contributions paid 
to sickness funds 
Wagstatf, van 
Doorslaer 1992,  
Denmark 1981 Kakwani index = -0.159 Regressive  Almost all private 
expenditures are out-of-
pocket. The remainder is 
tax funding 
  
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
Spain 1980 Kakwani index = 0.016 Progressive  Largely social insurance 
with some significant OOP 
and general taxes. Private 
insurance is minimal 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
France 1984 Kakwani index = - 0.28 Regressive  About three-quarters is 
social insurance, the rest are 
private, taxes and out of 
pocket 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Ireland 1987 Kakwani index = - 0.070 Regressive  Three quarters general taxes 
and a mixture of social, 
private insurance and OOP 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Portugal 1981 Kakwani index = -0.158 Regressive  Almost 30% of health 
financing was private and 
virtually all was out-of-
pocket. This grew to 40% in 
1987 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992   
Switzerlan
d 
1982 Kakwani index = -0.339 Regressive  Rely on out-of-pocket 
payments and private 
insurance premiums for the 
majority of revenues. 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992 
Italy 1987 Kakwani index = - 0.004 Regressive  Health financing split 
between general taxes and 
social insurance. With 
significant OOP 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992  
USA 1981 Kakwani index = -0.39 Regressive  Rely on out-of-pocket 
payments and private 
insurance premiums for the 
majority of revenues. 
Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 1992 
UK 1981 Kakwani index = -0.190 Regressive  13.5% of expenditures are 
private of which 64% are 
out-of-pocket 
  
Table 4: Determinants of Out of Pocket Payments 
Study and Year Country Determinants of Out of Pocket Payments 
 
Habibov N (2009) Tajikistan Ability to pay, gender, using specialized care 
  
Onwujekwe et al 
(2010)  Nigeria  Socio-economic status, 
 Ruger and Kim (2007) 
Republic of 
Korea 
Presence of illness/chronic condition, type of 
insurance, health care use, health facility type 
 Hong and Kim (2000)  U.S.A 
Age of household head, location of household( 
rural/urban) 
 Rubin and Koellin 
(1993) U.S.A 
 Insurance status, age of household head, 
education of household head, household size, 
race, welfare status of the household 
 Chu et al (2005) Taiwan 
Sex, sex of head, marital status, employment 
status, education, socio-economic status, 
location, household size 
 Hwang et al (2001) U.S.A 
Number of chronic conditions, race, sex, age, 
ethnicity, insurance status, poverty status 
 Mastilica and Chen 
(1998) Croatia Age, sex, socio-economic status 
 Hotchkiss et al(2005) Albania 
Insurance status, socio-economic status, type of 
service, type of facility 
 Mugisha et al (2002) Burkina Faso 
 
Where care was sought,  
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Objective To assess the progressivity and determinants of out of pocket 
health care payments in Zambia 
 
Methods  Based on data from the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 
(LCMS), conducted in 1998, 2004 and 2006 Kakwani index of 
progressivity were estimated with Lorenz and concentration 
curves. Dominance tests were also done to establish the 
statistical significance of dominance. The same data was also 
used to estimate factors determining incidence and magnitude 
of out of pocket payments using logistic and Tobit regressions 
respectively. 
 
Findings Results show that out of pocket payments were progressive in 
1998 and 2006, Kπ= 0.0366 and 0.0171 respectively while they 
were regressive in 2004(Kπ= -0.0799). Living in rural area was 
associated with less likelihood of incurring out of pocket 
payments but only in 2006. Households with more members 
and belonging to high socio-economic categories were more 
likely to incur out of pocket payments and consequently larger 
amounts out of pocket compared to smaller households and 
belonging to lower socio-economic categories respectively. 
 
Key Words Out of Pocket payments, Progressive, Regressive, Zambia, 
Health care financing.  
Word Count   8 230 including title and in-text references 
 
Key Messages 
  
 
1. Estimates show that in absolute terms out of pocket payments in both rural and 
urban Zambia increased between 1998 and 2004 but dropped in 2006 
 
2. Out of pocket payments were also progressive in 1998 and 2006 but regressive in 
2004 
 
3. Living in rural area significantly reduces both the likelihood of paying and the size 
of out of pocket payments in 2006 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
From the time Zambia got its independence from Britain, the government had been providing 
free health care services for all (Ministry of Health/Republic of Zambia. 2004). However, it 
became increasingly difficult to sustain this system especially when in the mid 1970s the 
country started experiencing macroeconomic challenges. This resulted in adverse effects on 
health and was compounded by increased poverty, inequality and unemployment and 
contractions in per capita household incomes and GDP. Ultimately, the public sector‟s ability 
to finance the provision of health care services diminished over time. In the wake of these 
challenges, there was an emergence of liberal economic reforms in many parts of Africa, 
popularly known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The main theme of these 
reforms among others was the removal of public subsidies and withdrawal of direct 
government provision of many social services including health care (McPherson 1995). 
Under the circumstances, the newly elected government, supported by donors, also referred 
  
to as cooperating partners in the Zambian health literature (Ministry of Health 2005, Ministry 
of Health Zambia 2006), began in the early 1990s to rationalize that if rich countries could 
not afford to provide free services to their populations, poor countries like Zambia could 
similarly not afford to sustain their “free-for-all” health policies. Thus in 1992, far-reaching 
national health reforms were initiated. A major tenet of the reforms was the cost-sharing 
health policy (introduced in 1993), which saw Zambia introducing user fees in all public 
facilities at all levels of care. Patients were now required to pay at the point of use of health 
services.  
These health reforms were initially greeted with enthusiasm, and some positive changes were 
recorded in the early years of the reform implementation (Gilson et al. 2003). In years that 
followed however there has been a reversal of the situation causing a waning of interest in the 
health reforms and increased skepticism. This generated intense (and on-going) debate about 
the ability of the reforms to foster a number of things including better coverage, equity and 
ease of access to health care (Blas, Limbambala 2001, Malama et al. 2002, van der Geest et 
al. 2000). The subject of user fees is at the center of the health reforms and health policy 
debate as a key policy instrument for health care financing. A key anxiety in this regard 
concerns the health and socio-economic implications of user fees as a financing option, 
particularly given the poverty context of health in Zambia. Masiye et al (2008) observe that 
implementing user fees in a health setting with widespread poverty and poor key health 
indicators has been very challenging. Contrary to expectations, user fees resulted in lower 
utilization rates and denied more people, especially the poor, access to health care. During the 
same period about 22% of urban and 30% of rural patients were turned away from health 
facilities because they could not pay for services upfront (Kondo, McPake 2007). User fees 
were later abolished in April 2006 but this was only for primary health care in rural areas. 
  
This implies that urban residents, as well as rural residents needing care beyond the primary 
level need to make direct payments. 
 
Despite these challenges Zambia‟s vision still remains to provide its people with equity of 
access to cost-effective, quality healthcare as close to the family as possible (Ministry of 
Health 2005). However, achieving this vision in a country where the majority people are poor 
as earlier pointed out is challenging especially if healthcare use is linked to one‟s demand 
instead of need. Health economists usually draw a difference between need and demand for 
health care (Asian Development Bank 2000). A person's need in this context is linked to a 
person's ability to benefit from health care, regardless of whether they are able to pay for it or 
not, whereas demand is specifically linked to the ability to pay, which for a poor person often 
is substantially less than his/her need. Because of this, it is generally accepted that for reasons 
of equity, individuals should contribute to health care according to their ability to pay but 
benefit according to their healthcare need (McIntyre 2009). In other words, those who have 
more resources should contribute more proportionally in paying for healthcare compared to 
those with fewer resources. At the same time, those with more health needs should benefit 
more from health services than those with fewer needs. Contributing to health care according 
to ability to pay is a vertical equity concept and is a major subject in many health policies. In 
health care financing vertical equity refers to the extent to which households of unequal 
ability to pay make appropriately dissimilar payments for health care (Cisse, Luchini & 
Moatti 2007a). If contributions to health care are proportionally related to one‟s ability to 
pay, they are said to be progressive. Hence, a progressive health care financing mechanism is 
one for which health payments increase proportionally with ones resources or income. This is 
desirable for achieving equity in the financing of health care. 
 
  
The main objective of this study is to assess the progressivity and determinants of OOP 
health care payments in Zambia.  Specifically the study seeks to measure OOP health 
expenditure as a share of total household expenditure and compare this across different socio-
economic groups. It also attempts to determine the characteristics of households who make 
OOP health care payments as well as assess factors that influence the incidence and size of 
OOP health care payments. It also compares trends in the progressivity of OOP health care 
payments for the three years (1998-2006) 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of 
progressivity of OOP payments. A section on data and methods follow thereafter. This is 
followed by the findings and discussion. The paper ends with conclusions and 
recommendations for policy interventions. 
 
1.2 Overview of Progressivity of OOP payments 
In Zambia, no specific study has been done to investigate the progressivity and determinants 
of OOP payments. A related study by Cheelo et al (2009) to measure out of pocket health 
expenditures and distribution of catastrophic payments in Zambia only estimated the 
relationship between OOP payments and household income. In most of the studies done in 
Africa, OOP payments are a regressive source of financing.  In sub-Saharan Africa, McIntyre 
et al (2005) note that health systems where a relatively large share of health care financing is 
attributable to OOP payments will always be regressive unless the majority of low-income 
people simply do not use health services when needed. They further stress that from the 
perspective of health service benefits, OOP payments are also inimical to equity, as benefits 
are distributed solely based on ability to pay rather than based on need for health care. 
Building on this argument, evidence from four francophone West African capitals (Abidjan, 
  
Bamako, Conakry and Dakar) strongly suggests a regressive pattern of OOP payments for 
health care, with lower income groups bearing a higher burden (Cisse, Luchini & Moatti 
2007b). Results also show that regressivity varies substantially across cities: It was a lot more 
regressive in Bamako and Conakry, with Kakwani indices of −0.22 and −0.52, respectively 
than in Dakar (−0.08). In a similar analysis of OOP costs for facility based maternity care in 
three other African countries, Perkins et al (2009) found that the fees paid for all deliveries 
(normal and complicated) by women for maternity care were regressive in all three countries 
(Burkina Faso, Kenya and Tanzania).  For example, in Tanzania, the average cost to the 
poorest women for all types of deliveries was US$4.6, compared with US$5.1 for all women. 
In Burkina Faso, the average cost to women in the poorest quintile was US$7.6 compared 
with US$7.9 for all women. In Kenya, women in the poorest quintile paid on average, 
US$20.3 which is more than the mean cost to all women (US$18.4).  
 
Internationally, the progressivity of OOP payments is mixed. Rasell et al. (1994) found in the 
United States that out-of-pocket spending was particularly regressive with low-income 
families‟ expenditures, as a share of income, nearly 9 times the level of those of high-income 
families. In Thailand, Pannarunothai et al (1997) observe that underprivileged families spent 
about 5–6% of their incomes OOP for health care, whereas other groups spent only 1–2%. In 
Asia, O‟Donnell (O'Donnell 2008) found that OOP payments where regressive in Taiwan and 
notes that the rich paid more OOP in absolute terms but less as a proportion of incomes. 
Similar results were obtained in Australia in a study by Lairson et al (1995).  They point out 
that though the entire health financing system is progressive, OOP payments were regressive 
with a Kakwani index of -0.15 compared to that of General tax (0.07) and Medicare levy 
(0.09). The progressivity of OOP payments have been recorded in some countries. For 
example, Yu et al (2008) report the progressivity of OOP expenditures in Malaysia in the 
  
period 1998/9 with a Kakwani index of approximately 0.1043. Authors note that the slight 
progressivity observed could have resulted from the switch to private health services by the 
rich and the predominant reliance on subsidized public health services by the poor. In 
Colombia, Castano et al (2002) observed that OOP expenditures behaved differently 
depending on the type of survey used. They highlight that when Kakwani indices were 
estimated using a survey that used household cash income, the burden appeared increasingly 
regressive, but when a survey that used total expenses was used, the burden became slightly 
progressive. They further explain that this lack of a clear evolution towards a less regressive 
burden can be plausibly explained by arguing that OOP payments increased for all 
households, but their rates of increase were larger for households in the middle deciles of 
expenses and lower for the better off and the worse off, at least for urban households 
(Castano et al, 2002) 
 
2.0 METHODOLOGY  
2.1 Data Sources  
This paper is based on three rounds of the Zambian Living Conditions and Monitoring 
Surveys (LCMS) – 1998, 2004, and 2006. These are nationally representative surveys 
conducted by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) as shown in Table 1. The LCMS 
contains information on several modules including demographic, health, education, 
household expenditure, household access to various amenities and facilities. They contain 
individual as well as household level information. Individual level data includes some 
relevant socio-demographic information (age, sex, education, urban/rural location etc). 
Relevant household level data include total household consumption, total household 
expenditure as well as out-of-pocket health expenditure. Other important details on the 
survey methodology are presented in appendix 15. 
  
 
2.2 Statistical Methods 
a. Estimating Out of Pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments refer to payments made by households at the point 
they receive health services. These payments are not reimbursed by any prepayment scheme. 
They could either be paid at a public or private facility. In this analysis, OOP payments 
included costs of medicines, fees to medical personnel (e.g. Doctor / Health Assistant / 
Midwife / Nurse / Dentist, etc), payments to hospital/health centre/surgery as well as fees to 
traditional healer. However, expenditure on health-related transportation is excluded. This 
avoids imputation of transport costs for households using private means of transportation. 
Total OOP expenditures for each household were adjusted by adult-equivalent household size 
to reflect each household member‟s OOP payment experience. 
 
b. Measuring Socio-economic Status 
Total household expenditure was used to estimate household socio-economic status in all the 
three periods considered. This is in line with the World Bank‟s recommendations for 
developing countries (Grosh, Glewwe 2000). Compared to income, there is less variability in 
household expenditure. Furthermore, total household expenditure was adjusted for household 
size and composition using equivalised household size to obtain equivalent household 
expenditure. Equivalised household size was obtained as follows: 
 
 
Where eqsize represents the number of consumption equivalents in the household                                             
and hhsize is the actual size. The value of β is estimated at 0.56 from data from 59 countries 
using fixed effects regression (Xu et al. 2003). This value is now being used as representative 
  
value in empirical studies of this nature. Households were further categorized into five 
quintiles of socio-economic status using the equivalent household expenditure. In all 
analyses, sample weights (aweights) were applied and the unit of analysis is the household. 
All analyses were carried out using STATA
TM
 10 software. 
c. Estimating Progressivity of Out of Pocket Payments. 
To estimate the progressivity of OOP payments the study first estimated OOP payment as a 
percentage of total household expenditure. Progressivity of OOP payments was assessed 
using the Kakwani Index of progressivity (Kakwani 1977). This is defined as the difference 
between the Gini coefficient for income (or expenditure) distribution (G) and the 
concentration index for the distribution of OOP payments (C). The Gini index follows a 
univariate distribution (i.e. solely measures income distribution (ability to pay) while the 
concentration index follows a bivariate distribution. For example, in this case comparing the 
distribution of out of pocket payments to household ability to pay variable e.g. total 
household expenditure. The Gin index is the ellipse-shaped area between the Lorenz Curve 
(Figure 1) as a proportion of the total area under the diagonal. It is therefore equal to one 
minus the area under the Lorenz Curve and ranges from zero (when there is complete 
equality and the Lorenz Curve coincides with the diagonal) to 1 (when all income is 
concentrated in the hands of one person). The concentration index (C) on the other hand is 
defined in exactly the same way except that the concentration curve L(s) is used instead of the 
Lorenz curve. Both the Concentration and Gini index can be calculated by; 
 
 
  
Where C is the concentration or Gini index, yi is the health payments (for C) or the measure 
of living standards (for G) and Ri is the fractional rank of the living standards measure (i.e. 
expenditure.) 
Kakwani index of progressivity is then derived from these two indices and is twice the area 
between the concentration curve for OOP payments and the Lorenz curve. This is defined as:  
 
Kπ = C– G 
 
Where C is the concentration index for health payments and G is the Gini coefficient of the 
ability to pay (ATP) variable (i.e. equivalent expenditure). If OOP expenses are a progressive 
(regressive) source of financing, the concentration curve will lie below (above) the Lorenz 
curve, and Kπ will be positive (negative). If OOP payments are perfectly correlated with 
income, Kπ will be zero and the financing source will be proportional. Proportionality could 
also arise when these curves cross each other. However, while visual inspection of 
concentration curves, Lorenz Curve and the line of equality may give an impression of 
whether there is dominance, this may not be sufficient to conclude whether or not dominance 
is statistically significant. It is also true to say that Concentration curves are estimated from 
survey data and so may display sampling variability. Therefore, it is important to provide 
statistical tests of dominance between the curves. To confirm dominance of concentration 
curves, dominance tests to see if the concentration curve dominated the Lorenz curve in each 
year were carried out for all the three years under analysis using the multiple comparison 
approach (MCA) decision rule, with comparisons at 19 equally spaced quintile points and a 5 
percent significance level (O‟Donnell and others, 2008). 
d.Factors determining Out of Pocket payments 
Model specification 
  
A logistic regression was used to assess the factors determining OOP payments. The model is 
thus specified in general as: 
iXy i  
Where out of pocket payments (a binary outcome) is the dependent variable (y
*
). It is 1 if 
household out of pocket payments is greater than 0 (oop > 0) and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables (Xi) are defined in table 3. Also α is the constant and βi the coefficients 
being estimated. The β coefficients have been interpreted in terms of log-odds ratios, a 
concept that is commonly used in biostatistics and epidemiology. Because of the particular 
functional form of the standard logistic distribution the odds ratio simplifies to 
P(y
*
=1)/P(y
*
=0) = exp (xβi) and therefore the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of 
changes in the log-odds-ratio log (P(y
*
=1)/P(y
*
=0)) (Jones, 2006). 
 
e. Factors determining size of Out of Pocket payments 
Tobit model is used to assess the factors determining the magnitude of OOP payments. This 
is because the dependent variable (oop) is limited or censored. There is sufficiently large 
number of OOP expenditures reported as zero. For example, only about 40% of households in 
all three surveys reported positive OOP payments, the rest of the observations are zeros. For 
such limited dependent variables the Tobit model (Tobin 1958) or sample selection models 
are usually a preferred model of analysis compared to the usual OLS. The Tobit model like 
other sample selection models assumes a truncated or censored dependent variable and uses 
all observations, both those at the lower limit and those above it, to estimate independent 
effects.  
 
  
The intuition behind a Tobit model is such that first, we have a latent model where the 
dependent variable, say, yi*, which has some independent variables and coefficients and a 
disturbance term that is normally distributed with a mean of zero. However, we have 
censoring at zero. Thus we have an observed yi that equals yi* if the value of yi* is greater 
than zero, but equals zero if the value of the unobserved yi* is less than or equal to zero. 
 
The Tobit model is thus represented by: 
 
 
Where yi* is the latent dependent variable-in this case out of pocket payments equal to or 
below zero (oop ≤ 0), yi is the observed dependent variable, i.e. positive out of pocket 
payments (oop > 0), xi is the vector of the independent variables, same as those in table 3.  β 
is the vector of coefficients, and the εi‟s are assumed to be independently normally 
distributed: εi ~N(0; σ) (and therefore yi ~N(xi β, σ).  
  
The Tobit model has been applied in many similar studies. For example, in Mugisha et al 
(Mugisha et al. 2002) in Burkina Faso to estimate OOP expenditure on health care where 
information was only available for independent variables (age, sex and income) but limited 
for the dependent variable (OOP expenditure) . The Tobit model has also been applied in 
Taiwan to assess health expenditure for the elderly where a good number of health 
expenditures were unreported (Chi, Hsin Fall 1999). Stoddard and Gray (Stoddard, Gray 
1997) also used the Tobit model to estimate maternal smoking and medical expenditures for 
  
childhood respiratory illness where the analysis included a large number of children with no 
respiratory-related medical expenditures.  
In this paper, the variables used in the regression analyses are presented and described in 
table 3. 
 
3.0 RESULTS  
Results are presented in this section. Generally, there were a lot of unreported OOP 
expenditures especially for poorer households in all the three data sets. This should be borne 
in mind when interpreting results especially concerning progressivity. As shown in table 2 
only about 11, 15 and 13 percent of households in the first quintile (poorest) reported paying 
OOP in the previous two weeks compared to 25, 23 and 24 percent of households in quintile 
5 (richest) for 1998, 2004 and 2006 respectively. Table 2 also shows that on average, 
households in the lowest socio-economic group spent the least OOP. 
 
Table 4 shows the mean OOP payments per adult equivalents by household characteristics in 
each year. Mean OOP per adult equivalent refers to the amount of OOP payments that each 
person in a given household spent on average after adjusting for household size and 
composition. The amount of OOP payments reported per household characteristic is in 
absolute terms and reported in Zambian Kwacha
1
. From table 4 it can be seen that on 
average, households in rural areas spent less OOP compared to households in urban areas for 
all three analyses. This was expected as households in rural areas may not afford to pay OOP. 
Absolute amount spent OOP was however largest in 2004 compared to the other two years 
for both rural and urban areas. This increase in OOP especially between 2004 and 2006 can 
be attributed to the abolition of user fees by government in early 2006. Similarly, households 
                                                          
1 exchange rates for 1998, 2004 and 2006 are K2388, K4772 and 3602 per US$1 respectively 
 
  
with married and male heads spent more OOP compared to households with unmarried and 
female heads respectively. When the age of the household head is considered, households 
headed by individuals who are younger than 25 years spent the least OOP in all three years. 
The largest OOP expenditure was spent by households whose head is aged between 34 and 
45 years in 1998 and 54-65 years in 2004 while households headed by an individual aged 
above 64 years spent the largest amount OOP in 2006. Households headed by a working head 
(wage employment or doing some business/self-employed) spent more OOP than households 
headed by a non-working household head. This is normal as non-working heads may not be 
able to afford random OOP payments. This distribution was consistent for all the three 
analyses. OOP expenditures also varied according to levels of education of household heads. 
There was an increasing trend in OOP expenditures as the level of education increased for all 
years under analysis. This is expected as the level of education is attributed to ones earning 
capacity, all things being equal. Usually more years of education are attributed to higher 
income earnings. Households where the head had primary education spent the least OOP 
while households where the head had higher education i.e. post secondary education had the 
largest OOP expenditure. There was no household head without any formal education. In 
terms of socio-economic status, as expected, quintile 1 (i.e. the poorest) spent the least OOP 
compared to all other quintiles in all the years while households in quintile 5 spent the most. 
The analysis also estimated the amount of equivalent OOP payments made in each category 
of socio-economic status as a proportion of equivalent household expenditure. From table 5 it 
can be seen that OOP payments as a proportion of total household expenditure increased with 
household expenditure consistently for the 1998 analysis. 
Intuitively, it can be observed that OOP payments were progressive in 1998. However, it is 
difficult to draw a similar conclusion for the 2004 and 2006 analyses given the inconsistent 
  
relationship between equivalent OOP payments and equivalent household expenditure 
observed for the two years. Whereas OOP payments as a proportion of household expenditure 
increased consistently with income in 1998, the picture is different for the other two years 
making it difficult to conclude on the progressivity of payments. In such cases, the Kakwani 
index is used to draw a conclusion.  
 
The results presented in table 5 confirm that OOP payments were generally progressive in 
1998 (Kπ= 0.03656) and in 2006 (Kπ= 0.0171) while they were regressive in 2004 (Kπ= 
0.0799). A visual sense of the progressiveness and regressiveness of OOP payments for all 
analyses can further be seen in figures 2, 3 and 4. In figure 2 and 4 the concentration curve - 
L(s) lies below or outside Lorenz curve - L(x) suggesting that OOP payments were 
progressive in 1998 and 2006. On the contrary, the L(s) for 2004 lies above or inside the L(x) 
especially for the lower levels of socio-economic status implying that OOP payment were 
regressive in 2004.  
Dominance test results presented in table 6 compare the cumulative shares of equivalent 
expenditure with the cumulative shares of equivalent OOP payments.  It can be observed that 
the Lorenz curve significantly dominates the OOP payments concentration curve at all 
quintile points presented in the 1998 and 2006 analyses. However, in 2004 the Lorenz curve 
is significantly dominated for the first and second 20% of the population. As can be seen 
from table 6 the difference between the Lorenz curve and concentration curve for the last two 
quintiles of 2004 is not significant at the 10% level of significance. 
 
The results of the Logistic and Tobit regression presented in table 7 shows that the overall 
models are highly significant as well as most of the variables. Larger households were 
significantly more likely to incur OOP expenditure in all three analyses. On the other hand, 
  
rural households are less likely to incur OOP payments compared to urban households in all 
the years but this is only significant in 2006. This implies that the location of a household was 
not associated with OOP spending in 1998 and 2004. Households headed by older heads were 
less likely to incur OOP payments but this is not significant in 2006. The odds of OOP 
spending also tend to reduce significantly for households headed by males compared to 
households headed by females. In all analyses, households with a married head were more 
likely to spend OOP compared to households headed by unmarried heads. Increasing the 
number of years of education of the household head significantly reduces the odds of 
spending OOP in all the years. This is despite the belief that households headed by more 
educated heads may also earn higher incomes given the positive relationship between income 
and education and hence be in a better position to meet OOP payments. All results were not 
significant for work status of the household head. Lastly as expected, belonging to a higher 
socio-economic group significantly increases the odds of OOP spending. This was significant 
at 1% level of significance for all three years.  
 
Comparing results of logistic and Tobit regressions it can be seen that increasing the number 
of people in a household does not only increase the likelihood of spending OOP but also 
significantly increases the magnitude spent OOP. This is consistent for all analyses. 
Similarly, households headed by a male spend less OOP compared to households headed by a 
female head for all years under analysis. Location of a household had no effect on the size of 
household OOP in 2004 and 2006 except in 1998. In 1998 rural households were likely to 
spend less OOP compared to urban households at a significant level of 5%. Age of a 
household head had no effect on the size of OOP payments by a household. Furthermore, 
belonging to a higher socio-economic status does not only increase the likelihood of spending 
OOP as observed by significant results in table 7 but also increases the magnitude households 
  
spent OOP. This can be seen by significant results (1% level of significance) obtained in the 
Tobit regression. Results are not significant in 1998 and 2004 on the effect of different levels 
of education on household OOP payments. However, taking primary education as a reference 
category, households headed by a head with secondary and higher education were likely to 
spend less OOP. This is contrary to expectations and descriptive statistics. Work status of the 
household head was significantly associated with lower amounts of household OOP 
payments in 2006. Results were not significant for the other years.   
 
4.0 Discussion 
Out of pocket payments remain one of the single largest sources of health care financing in 
Zambia and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. This paper examines the progressivity and 
determinants of OOP payments in Zambia. The Kakwani index of progressivity was used to 
assess progressivity on data drawn from the 1998, 2004 and 2006 living conditions 
monitoring survey. These data were also used to assess factors affecting OOP payments using 
regression based analysis.   
 
The empirical results reveal many important things. Notably, in absolute terms, OOP 
payments generally increased from 1998 to 2004 and dropped in 2006. Dwelling in a rural 
area compared to an urban area was significantly associated with a lower likelihood of 
spending OOP but only in 2006 and not in the other two years. Results were significant for 
2006 at the 1% level of significance and not significant for the other two years. These 
findings are not mere coincidence but seem to point to one thing and it seems safe to make 
the following conclusion. In April 2006, about 8 months prior to the 2006 survey the 
government of Zambia, after much debate and deliberations abolished user fees for primary 
health care in all public facilities in rural areas. Households in rural areas were to obtain 
  
primary health care services without paying. This may offer an explanation for the observed 
results. It could be true that after user fees were abolished paying OOP reduced in rural areas 
compared to urban areas. What makes this explanation even more valid are the results of the 
study by Masiye et al (2010) undertaken 15 months after the user fee abolition policy was 
implemented. The findings in this study are that user fee removal was accompanied by 
increased utilisation of health care services. Based on this, it is likely that removal of user 
fees for primary health care in rural areas reduced the payment of OOP payments allowing 
more people to access health care services especially in rural Zambia.  
Evidence on the role of OOP payments in creating barriers to access to health care has been 
documented in a number of countries. In Tanzania, Manzi et al (2005) found that OOP 
payments did not only place an inequitable financial burden on poor families but also 
negatively affected utilisation. In Mexico Arredondo and Najera pointed out that high OOP 
payments in Mexico tended to create a barrier to access to health care. This clearly indicates 
that OOP payments actually hinder health care use and that user fee removal is one way they 
can be reduced. 
The study also found progressive out of pocket payments in 1998 and 2006. However, it 
should be mentioned in the strongest of terms that this result should be treated cautiously. 
The reason for this is that there were so many unreported OOP payments especially by the 
poor households as earlier demonstrated. It has also been observed from descriptive statistics 
that more OOP payments were made by households of high socio-economic status compared 
to households of low socio-economic status. Low OOP payments among the poorest are due 
to the fact that they do not use health care services because they cannot afford to pay. To this 
effect, it could be true that the apparent progressivity observed in the two years is at the 
expense of the poor households who did not make as much OOP payments as the richer 
  
households. McIntyre et al (2005) have also observed this phenomenon for many sub-
Saharan African countries where OOP payments are predominant. 
Overall, descriptive statistics also show more OOP payments in urban areas compared to 
rural areas. This may be because the urban population are more educated and have more 
income and economic power and are hence more able to spend OOP than the rural 
population. Results also show that the likelihood of spending OOP rises with household size. 
This also applies to the size of OOP payments. This finding is consistent with similar studies. 
For example, O‟Donnell (2008) found that larger households in Bangladesh and Thailand 
were more likely to spend OOP and thus were more susceptible to catastrophic health 
expenditures. It has also empirically been established that generally the likelihood of 
households spending OOP as well as the size of payments significantly increased with 
household income. Naturally, richer households may be more able to afford OOP payments 
compared to poorer households who usually have to choose between making health payments 
and spending on other household basic needs. This finding is also consistent with other 
international studies (Leive & Xu, 2008). Results further show that the likelihood of spending 
OOP reduced significantly if the household head was male and older. However, it increased 
for households with a married head. The same effect was observed in terms of the size of 
OOP payments, except for the actor of age which was not significant for all the analyses, 
implying that age of a household head did not affect the amount spent OOP. These results are 
also consistent with those found by Chu et al (2005) in Taiwan. 
However, the study was not without limitations. To begin with, the living conditions 
monitoring survey, like all household surveys, is prone to respondent errors and recall biases. 
This may affect the findings by either over-estimating or under-estimating of some important 
variables. For example, survey data on OOP payments are potentially subject to both recall 
bias and small sample bias due to the infrequency with which some health care payments are 
  
made. This problem is compounded by the fact that the survey only collects health 
expenditures made in the month prior to the survey. Given the seasonality of illness and 
consequential health payments, a one month recall period may lead to eventual biases. The 
study used the household as a unit of analysis. This is a limitation in the sense that creation of 
household-level variables does not account for some of the complexities of the diversity in 
families. However, this was important to create a clearer analysis.  
 
Secondly, the use of the summary index to determine progressivity of health payments also 
tends to be problematic and un-interpretable in situations where curves cross. However, this 
has been checked by testing for the dominance of Lorenz and concentration curves.  
 
Thirdly, the operational definition of OOP payments did not include transport costs and other 
health related expenditures such as food and patient care. While it is understood that the 
computation of these aspects of costs is challenging due to lack of uniformity in transport 
forms and forms of patient care, it is also possible that if these components were included 
either the progressivity or regressivity observed may be more pronounced or be offset. For 
example, take two patients, one poor and the other rich (in terms of their income) who visit a 
health facility. If they each pay the same amount i.e. a fixed sum for a health service, we say 
this is regressive because their initial incomes are not related to the payments made. 
Nevertheless, if the poorer patient did not incur any transport costs while the richer patient 
did, the regressivity observed may be offset by the additional cost of transport spent by the 
richer patient. On the other hand, if on top of this regressive payment the poorer patient spent 
more money on transport while the richer patient did not, the regressivity will even be more 
pronounced. In this regard, future studies should find ways of computing transport costs and 
include them in the analysis of progressivity of health payments.  
  
 
Lastly, when interpreting progressivity results for this particular study it should be borne in 
mind that in all three analyses there were a sufficiently large number of zero OOP payments. 
This imply that payments appear progressive only because a larger portion of households, 
especially poor ones, did not use health services and consequently could not make any health 
payments at all.  
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of this analysis, OOP was progressive in the two years (1998 and 2006) 
and regressive in 2004. However, the apparent progressivity in the two years is due to the fact 
that richer households made more out of pocket payments than poor households. This is 
evidence from Table 2. It can be concluded that the progressivity of OOP in Zambia is at the 
expense of the poor who could not afford to pay for health care. The study also asserts that 
the reduction in OOP payments observed between 2004 and 2006 is attributable to the 
abolition of user fees for rural primary health care in early 2006. This has been validated by 
another study which found increased health care utilization after abolition of user fees at rural 
primary health care facilities in the year 2006 (Masiye et al. 2008). In view of the foregoing 
findings, there is need to cushion households from making out of pocket payments as this 
may be regressive. Additionally, out-of-pocket payments may be progressive when the poor 
do not make payments as they cannot afford care. This has been demonstrated in this study. 
To mitigate these, alternative health financing mechanisms that are more progressive, 
guarantee access to care by all, and do not require health care users to pay at the point of use 
of health services should be introduced and promoted.  This will reduce the incidence and the 
amount spent out of pocket by households. Furthermore, there is a need to pursue more 
  
equitable health care financing mechanisms in Zambia which are truly progressive as 
opposed to OOP payments.  
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Table 1: Household Socio-demographic characteristics of the Three LCM Surveys 
Survey Year 1998 2004 2006 
Approximate Sample Size 16,740 19,000 18,000 
Age of Household Head :Mean (SD) 41.4             ( 
14) 
41.6               
(14)    
41.6              (14)  
Household Size: Mean (SD) 7.1               
(4.0) 
6.6                 
(3.1) 
6.4                
(2.8) 
Female Headed Households n   % 3753            4,290            4,223            
  
 
Table 2 Proportion of Households Reporting Illness, paying OOP and Average OOP paid in 
the last 2 weeks by Socio-economic status 
  % Reporting 
illness/injury 
% Reporting 
Paying OOP 
Mean paid 
OOP(Kwacha) 
199
8 
200
4 
2006 199
8 
2004 200
6 
1998 2004 2006 
Socio-economic Status                   
Quintile 1 19 19 22 11 15 13 445 3860 1078 
Quintile 2 22 19 20 18 18 20 1165 3959 2989 
Quintile 3 20 21 20 21 21 20 2475 4859 4568 
Quintile 4 20 21 20 25 22 23 4671 9402 7693 
Quintile 5 20 20 18 25 23 24 1235
5 
27287 2679
8 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 4219 9873 8623 
 
Table 3: Variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Variable definition and description 
Dependent variable 
 
oop 
 
Out of pocket payments (in logistic regression oop =1 if a 
household paid OOP; 0 = if not) (in tobit regression oop is a 
continuous variable and left censored at 0) 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
hh_size 
Number of persons in a household  
 
Location 
 
Location of household (1=Rural; 0= Urban ) 
 
age_hh 
 
Age of household head in years 
 
sex_hh 
 
Sex of household head (1=Male; 0= Female) 
 
ms_hh 
 
Marital status of household head (1=Married; 0= Not married) 
22.5 22.1 22.7 
Married Household Head n   % 12,097         
72.4 
14,001          
72.5 
13,275          
71.5 
Years of Education of Head: Mean 
(SD) 
8.0               
(3.3) 
8.1                 
(3.4) 
8.2                 
(3.4) 
Working Household Heads n  % 8,125           
49.0 
10,497          
54.8 
8,829             
47.5 
Rural Households n   % 8,452           
51.0 
10,402          
53.8 
9,122             
49.0 
  
 
Work_hhead 
 
Work status of household head (1= working; 0=Not working) 
 
educ_hh 
 
Maximum number of education of household head 
 
 
expenditure  
 
Household socio-economic status measured by household 
expenditure. Quantiles are in ascending order i.e. the first quantile 
also represents the sub-population with the lowest household 
expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Mean OOP payments per adult equivalents by household characteristics in Zambian 
Kwacha
 
Household Characteristics 1998
 
2004
 
2006
 
Location of household    
Rural 755 1, 842 1, 762 
Urban 2, 321 6, 173 5, 763 
Marital status of household head    
Married 1, 330 3, 582 3, 172 
Not married 1, 261 3, 405 3, 136 
Sex of household Head    
Male 1, 403 3, 617 3, 269 
Female 1, 005 3, 233 2, 794 
Age of household head    
<25 837 1, 796 1, 680 
24-35 1, 364 3, 289 3, 082 
34-45 1, 464 3, 732 3, 405 
44-55 1, 211 4, 180 3, 281 
54-65 1, 335 4, 778 3, 074 
>64 1, 244 2, 397 3, 624 
Occupation of household Head    
Working/business 2, 091 5, 450 5, 155 
Not working 785 2, 086 1, 958 
Education of household Head    
Primary 880 2, 079 1, 982 
Secondary 1, 809 4, 123 3, 620 
Higher  3, 499 11, 963 10, 259 
Household expenditure quintiles    
Quintile 1 156 1, 393 383 
Quintile 2 411 1, 272 964 
Quintile 3 794 1, 647 1, 597 
Quintile 4 1, 467 3, 287 2, 704 
Quintile 5 4, 170 9, 727 9, 915 
  
 
 
 
Table 5: Equivalent out of pocket payments by household equivalent expenditure quintiles 
 
Years 
Expenditure 
quintiles 
Equivalent 
household OOP 
payments 
Equivalent 
household 
expenditure  
Equivalent OOP 
payments % of 
equivalent 
expenditure 
1998
 
Quintile 1  156 13, 934 1.14 
 Quintile 2 411 31, 953 1.28 
 Quintile 3 794 53, 436 1.47 
 Quintile 4 1, 467 86, 633 1.66 
 Quintile 5 4, 170 239, 736 1.75 
 Total 1, 399 85, 122 1.46 
 Gini index  0.51998  
 Concentration index 0.55654   
 Kakwani Index 0.03656   
     
2004
 
Quintile 1  1, 393 31, 506 1.63 
 Quintile 2 1, 272 88, 351 1.43 
 Quintile 3 1, 647 142, 567 1.14 
 Quintile 4 3, 287 229, 951 1.47 
 Quintile 5 9, 727 586, 466 1.83 
 Total 3, 465 215, 731 1.50 
 Gini index  0.52633  
 Concentration index 0.44646   
 Kakwani Index -0.0799   
     
2006
 
Quintile 1  383 34, 672 1.21 
 Quintile 2 964 72, 682 1.31 
 Quintile 3 1, 597 121, 650 1.30 
 Quintile 4 2, 704 211, 996 1.27 
 Quintile 5 9, 915 676, 883 1.50 
 Total 3, 112 223, 543 1.31 
 Gini index  0.5294  
 Concentration index 0.5465   
 Kakwani Index 0.0171   
 
 
 
Table 6 Dominance tests of Lorenz Curve against OOP concentration curve, 1998-2006 
 
Year/quintiles Cum. Shares of 
expenditure 
Cum. Shares of 
OOP payments 
Diff from exp 
share (p-values) 
  
1998    
q20 3.28% 2.24% 0.000 
q40 10.82% 8.15% 0.000 
q60 23.40% 19.85% 0.000 
q80 43.72% 40.43% 0.000 
2004    
q20 2.92% 8.03% 0.000 
q40 11.10% 15.38% 0.000 
q60 24.31% 24.89% 0.4601 
q80 45.63% 43.56% 0.1749 
2006    
q20 3.10% 2.46% 0.0000 
q40 9.60% 8.66% 0.0033 
q60 20.49% 18.92% 0.0083 
q80 39.46% 36.30% 0.0022 
 
 
Table 7: Logistic and Tobit Regression for the determinants and size of OOP 
payments
1 
Variables 
Odds of spending OOP/Size of OOP  
1998 2004 2006 
hhsize 
1.07
*** 
1543*** 
1.08
***
 
4602*** 
1.08*** 
6133*** 
location_hhold 
0.96 
-1613 
0.98 
-4440 
0.87*** 
-4668 
age_hhead 
0.94*** 
-2 
0.96*** 
415 
0.98 
1894 
sex_hhead 
0.80*** 
-3298** 
0.81*** 
-15715*** 
0.82*** 
-16950** 
marital 
status_hhead 
1.35*** 
4811*** 
1.35*** 
20134*** 
1.44*** 
32851*** 
education_hhead 
0.98*** 
-47 
0.90*** 
627 
0.95*** 
-2274*** 
working_hhead 
1.07 
470 
0.98 
655 
0.95 
-11038** 
expenditure 
quintiles 
1.32*** 
7642*** 
1.20*** 
14129*** 
1.32*** 
29228*** 
constant  -58162***  -151248*** 
 -
251830*** 
n 14 033 16 763 16 331 
Prob>F 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
Dependent variable: OOP (binary for logistic regression and continuous 
  
for Tobit regression)   
  
1 First row shows logistic regression results and the second row represents 
tobit regression results. 
 
 
Figure 1 Gini Coefficient (Index) 
 
 
Figure 2 Lorenz and OOP Payments Concentration Curves, Zambia 1998. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure3 Lorenz and OOP payments concentration curves, Zambia 2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Lorenz and OOP payments concentration curves, Zambia 2006 
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Appendix 3a: Logistic regression for the determinants of incidence of out of pocket payments 
in Zambia-1998 
 
logistic oop1 hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead 
quintiles 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =      14032 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     652.93 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -9041.8047                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0348 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        oop1 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   1.071191   .0066837    11.02   0.000     1.058171    1.084371 
    Location |   .9633319   .0437196    -0.82   0.410     .8813435    1.052947 
   Age_Hhead |   .9425047   .0148642    -3.75   0.000     .9138171     .972093 
   Sex_Hhead |   .7951229   .0506916    -3.60   0.000     .7017258    .9009508 
Marital_Hh~d |   1.353367   .0813591     5.03   0.000     1.202942    1.522603 
  Educ_Hhead |   .9182486   .0287529    -2.72   0.006     .8635884    .9763685 
  Work_Hhead |   1.061812   .0494671     1.29   0.198     .9691532     1.16333 
   quintiles |   1.315058   .0199331    18.07   0.000     1.276565    1.354713 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 3b: Tobit regression for the determinants of size of out of pocket payments in 
Zambia-1998 
 
Tobit oop hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead quintiles, 
ll 
 
  
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =      14032 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     764.48 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -69582.725                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0055 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         oop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   1534.438   143.7897    10.67   0.000     1252.591    1816.285 
    Location |   -1473.34   1099.071    -1.34   0.180    -3627.665    680.9845 
   Age_Hhead |   48.43017   385.2945     0.13   0.900    -706.7984    803.6588 
   Sex_Hhead |  -3398.475    1576.82    -2.16   0.031    -6489.251   -307.6977 
Marital_Hh~d |     4826.3    1483.19     3.25   0.001      1919.05    7733.549 
  Educ_Hhead |    480.042   758.0774     0.63   0.527    -1005.891    1965.975 
  Work_Hhead |   224.3991   1134.427     0.20   0.843    -1999.228    2448.026 
   quintiles |   7551.412   375.6648    20.10   0.000     6815.059    8287.765 
       _cons |  -59481.97   2786.177   -21.35   0.000    -64943.25   -54020.69 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   42372.56   420.4032                      41548.51     43196.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       8594  left-censored observations at oop<=0 
                      5438     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
Appendix 4a: Logistic regression for the determinants of incidence of out of pocket payments 
in Zambia-2004 
 
logistic oop1 hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead 
quintiles 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =      16763 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     416.83 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -11110.222                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0184 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        oop1 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   1.076996   .0066626    11.99   0.000     1.064016    1.090134 
    Location |   .9848851   .0406057    -0.37   0.712       .90843    1.067775 
   Age_Hhead |   .9583246    .012809    -3.18   0.001     .9335453    .9837615 
   Sex_Hhead |   .8141056   .0463419    -3.61   0.000     .7281606    .9101947 
Marital_Hh~d |   1.348289   .0725971     5.55   0.000     1.213252    1.498356 
  Educ_Hhead |    .898426   .0255419    -3.77   0.000      .849734    .9499082 
  Work_Hhead |   .9761651    .041566    -0.57   0.571     .8980042    1.061129 
   quintiles |   1.197166   .0145751    14.78   0.000     1.168937    1.226076 
 
 
 
Appendix 4b: Tobit regression for the determinants of size of out of pocket payments in 
Zambia-2004 
 
tobit oop hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead quintiles,ll 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =      16763 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     421.47 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -94643.414                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0022 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         oop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   4606.009   472.0647     9.76   0.000     3680.713    5531.306 
    Location |  -4247.771   3212.006    -1.32   0.186    -10543.64    2048.101 
   Age_Hhead |     354.57   1050.075     0.34   0.736    -1703.688    2412.828 
   Sex_Hhead |  -15701.23   4535.674    -3.46   0.001    -24591.63   -6810.828 
Marital_Hh~d |   20204.19   4283.648     4.72   0.000     11807.79    28600.59 
  Educ_Hhead |   4342.065   2207.155     1.97   0.049     15.80862     8668.32 
  Work_Hhead |    239.664   3328.291     0.07   0.943    -6284.138    6763.466 
   quintiles |   14052.02    951.282    14.77   0.000     12187.41    15916.64 
       _cons |  -156986.5   8100.875   -19.38   0.000      -172865   -141107.9 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   134883.3   1188.858                      132553.1    137213.6 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       9964  left-censored observations at oop<=0 
                      6799     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5a: Logistic regression for the determinants of incidence of out of pocket payments 
in Zambia-2006 
 
logistic oop1 hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead 
quintiles 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =      16361 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     544.93 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -9857.5123                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0269 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        oop1 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   1.081312   .0074278    11.38   0.000     1.066852    1.095969 
    Location |   1.150841   .0517491     3.12   0.002     1.053756    1.256871 
   Age_Hhead |   .9789542   .0143139    -1.45   0.146     .9512976    1.007415 
   Sex_Hhead |   .8170794   .0524633    -3.15   0.002     .7204604    .9266558 
Marital_Hh~d |   1.437437   .0876894     5.95   0.000     1.275447    1.620002 
  Educ_Hhead |   .9513594   .0060372    -7.86   0.000        .9396    .9632659 
  Work_Hhead |   .9522092   .0429907    -1.08   0.278     .8715694     1.04031 
   quintiles |   1.339289   .0222379    17.59   0.000     1.296405    1.383592 
 
 
Appendix 5b: Tobit regression for the determinants of size of out of pocket payments in 
Zambia-2006 
 
tobit oop hhsize Location Age_Hhead Sex_Hhead Marital_Hhead Educ_Hhead Work_Hhead quintiles,ll 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =      16361 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     478.73 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -73150.836                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0033 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         oop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      hhsize |   6133.419   721.2095     8.50   0.000      4719.77    7547.068 
    Location |   4668.667   4760.454     0.98   0.327    -4662.342    13999.68 
   Age_Hhead |   1894.945   1543.821     1.23   0.220    -1131.112    4921.002 
   Sex_Hhead |  -16950.01   6801.257    -2.49   0.013    -30281.22   -3618.807 
Marital_Hh~d |   32851.01   6441.556     5.10   0.000     20224.85    45477.16 
  Educ_Hhead |  -2274.555   669.6352    -3.40   0.001    -3587.113   -961.9974 
  Work_Hhead |  -11037.87   4758.863    -2.32   0.020    -20365.76   -1709.984 
   quintiles |   29228.31   1762.011    16.59   0.000     25774.58    32682.05 
       _cons |  -261167.8   10386.85   -25.14   0.000    -281527.2   -240808.4 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |     182532   1871.402                      178863.9    186200.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:      11288  left-censored observations at oop<=0 
                      5073     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
  
 
Appendix 6: construction of household expenditure variables 
 
Variable Description Original variable 
hid Household id  
weight Weight variable for exploration  
oop_drug OOP on medicines expmedsn 
oop_fee OOP on consultations expdocfe 
oop_trad OOP on traditional healers exptradi 
oop_inp OOP on hospitalization exphsptl 
oop Total household OOP  
exp Total household expenditure  
eqoop_eqexp Proportion of OOP to total expenditure oop, exp 
eqsize Equivalized household size hhsize 
eqexp Equivalized household expenditure exp, eqsize 
eqoop Equivalized household OOP oop, eqsize 
quintile  Equivalized expenditure quintile eqexp 
rank Cum. Prop. Hholds eqexp 
oop_cc OOP concentration curve eqoop 
Lorenz Lorenz curve eqexp 
 
rename expmedsn oop_drug 
rename expmdocfe oop_fee 
rename exptradi oop_trad 
rename exphsptl oop_inp 
egen oop_new = rsum(oop_drug oop_fee oop_trad oop_inp) 
egen oop=sum(oop_new),by(hid)....//generates household level OOP variable// 
gen eqsize = hhsize^0.56 
gen eqoop = oop/eqsize 
gen eqexp_new = exp/eqsize 
egen eqexp=sum(eqexp_new),by(hid)..//generates household level exp variable// 
gen eqoop_eqexp = eqoop/eqexp 
xtile quintile = eqexp [aw=weight], nq(5) 
 
//generating rank, Lorenz and concentration curves variables// 
glcurve eqexp [aw=weight], glvar(Lorenz) pvar(rank) lorenz nograph 
label variable Lorenz "Lorenz curve" 
label variable rank "Cum. Prop. Hholds." 
glcurve eqoop [aw=weight], gl(oop_cc) sortvar(eqexp) lorenz nograph 
label variable oop_cc "OOP payments" 
 
Appendix 7: Household socio-demographic variables 
Variable Description Original variable 
  
Age_Hhead Age of household head age 
Sex_Hhead Sex of household head sex 
Marital_Hhead Marital status of household head Marital status 
Location Location of household rururb 
Educ_Hhead Education of household head education 
Work_Hhead Work status of household head occupation 
 
gen age_Hhead= age if pid==1 
gen sex_Hhead= sex if pid==1 
gen educ_Hhead= education if pid==1 
gen marital_Hhead= marital status if pid==1 
gen work_Hhead= occupation  if pid==1 
 
//categorical variable for age of household head// 
replace age_Hhead=1 if age_Hhead < 25 
replace age_Hhead =2 if age_Hhead > 24 & age_Hhead < 35 
replace age_Hhead =3 if age_Hhead > 34 & age_Hhead < 45 
replace age_Hhead =4 if age_Hhead > 44 & age_Hhead < 55 
replace age_Hhead =5 if age_Hhead > 54 & age_Hhead < 65 
replace age_Hhead =6 if age_Hhead > 64 & age_Hhead < 100 
 
//categorical variable for education of household head// 
replace educ_Hhead=1 if educ_Hhead ==0 
replace educ_Hhead =2 if educ_Hhead > 0 & educ_Hhead < 8 
replace educ_Hhead =3 if educ_Hhead > 7 & educ_Hhead < 13 
replace educ_Hhead =4 if educ_Hhead > 12 & educ_Hhead < 19 
 
Appendix 8: Estimating mean household equivalent OOP payments per household 
characteristic 
 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Age_Hhead) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Sex_Hhead) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Marital_Hhead) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Location) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Educ_Hhead) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(Work_Hhead) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop [aw=weight], by(quintile) stats(co mean sum) 
 
Appendix 9: Estimating mean equivalent household expenditure and mean equivalent OOP 
expenditure proportion of mean equivalent household expenditure per quintile 
 
tabstat eqexp [aw=weight], by(quintile) stats(co mean sum) 
tabstat eqoop_eqexp [aw=weight], by(quintile) stats(co mean sum) 
 
 
Appendix 10: Estimating Lorenz and OOP concentration curves 
 
  
glcurve eqexp [aw=weight], lorenz plot(line oop_cc rank,legend(label(2 "OOP payments"))|| 
///line rank rank, legend(label(3 "line of equality"))) /// 
yti(Cumulative prop. of payments) xti("Cum Prop.of Hholds, ranked by equivalent 
expenditure") 
 
 
Appendix 11: Estimating OOP concentration index 
 
egen raw_rank=rank(eqexp), unique 
sort raw_rank 
quietly sum weight 
gen wi=weight/r(sum) 
gen cusum=sum(wi) 
gen wj=cusum[_n-1] 
replace wj=0 if wj==. 
gen rank1=wj+0.5*wi 
  
qui sum oop_cc [aw=weight] 
scalar mean=r(mean) 
cor oop_cc rank1 [aw=weight], c 
sca c=(2/mean)*r(cov_12) 
sca list c 
 
 
Appendix 12: estimating Gini coefficient 
qui sum Lorenz [aw=weight] 
scalar mean=r(mean) 
cor Lorenz rank1 [aw=weight], c 
sca c=(2/mean)*r(cov_12) 
sca list c 
 
 
Appendix 13: testing for dominance of Lorenz and OOP concentration index 
 
dominance eqoop [aw=weig], shares(quintiles) sort(eqexp) 
 
 
Appendix 14: estimating determinants of incidence and size of OOP payments 
 
logistic oop hhsize location age_Hhead sex_Hhead ms_hh educ_Hhead work_Hhead 
quintiles 
 
tobit oop_1 hhsize location age_Hhead sex_Hhead ms_hh educ_Hhead work_Hhead 
quintiles,ll 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 15: Background and Sample design methodology of the Living Conditions 
Monitoring Survey (Central Statistical Office, 2006) 
 
Survey Background  
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that the government of Zambia had 
implemented since 1991 has had some successes and shortcomings. Some components of the 
programme such as privatisation have been implemented at record pace. Others such as 
liberalization of agricultural marketing have not completely taken root. It is generally 
acknowledged that which ever is the case, a substantial segment of the population is still 
adversely affected by the cost of reforming the Zambian economy. It is from this realisation 
that the Zambian government and it‟s cooperating partners decided to put in place a 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism in 1991, which was implemented through the conduct 
of the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Surveys (SDAs). 
The Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (LCMS) evolved from the Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment Priority surveys conducted in 1991 (PSI) and 1993 (PSII), by the Central 
Statistical Office. So far, four Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys have been conducted. 
These are: - 
(i) The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey I of 1996 
(ii) The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey II of 1998 
(iii) The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey III of 2002/2003, and 
(iv) The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey IV of 2004 
 
Objectives of the LCMSIV Survey 
Since 1991, the country has been utilizing cross-sectional sample data to monitor the well-
being of the Zambian population, as was the case with the 1996 and 1998 LCMS surveys. 
However, in 2002/2003 a different methodology was employed to collect and analyse data. 
The survey was designed to collect data for a period of 12 months, to take into account 
seasonal effects. 
  
  
The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey IV (LCMSIV) was intended to highlight and 
monitor the living conditions of the Zambian society. The survey included a set of priority 
indicators on poverty and living conditions that could easily be compared to previous surveys 
such as the 1998 LCMS(II) 
The main objective of the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey IV (LCMSIV) is to provide 
the basis for comparison of poverty estimates derived from cross-sectional survey data. In 
addition, the survey provides a basis on which to: - 
 Monitor the impact of government policies and donor support on the well being of the 
Zambian population. 
 Monitor poverty and its distribution in Zambia.  
 
 Provide various users with a set of reliable indicators against which to monitor 
development. 
 
 Identify vulnerable groups in society and enhance targeting in policy implementation. 
 
For the purpose of computing indicators to meet the stated objectives, the LCMSIV 
questionnaire included the following topics:- 
 Demography and migration 
 Household Amenities and Housing Conditions 
 Orphan hood 
 Health 
 Education 
 Economic Activities  
 Income 
 Household Assets 
 Household Access to facilities 
 Self-assessed poverty and household coping strategies, and 
 Agricultural production 
 
  
Sample Design and Coverage 
The Living Conditions Monitoring Survey IV had a nationwide coverage on a sample basis. 
It covered both rural and urban areas in all the nine provinces. The survey was designed to 
provide data for each and every district in Zambia. A sample size of about 1048 SEAs and 
approximately 20,000 households was drawn. 
 
Sample Stratification and Allocation  
The sampling frame used for LCMSIV survey was developed from the 2000 Census of 
Population and Housing. The country is administratively demarcated into 9 provinces, which 
are further divided into 72 districts. The districts are further subdivided into 155 
constituencies, which are also divided into wards. Wards consists of Census Supervisory 
Areas (CSA), which are further subdivided into Standard Enumeration areas (SEAs). For the 
purposes of this survey, SEAs constituted the ultimate Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).  
 
In order to have equal precision in the estimates in all the districts and at the same time take 
into account variation in the sizes of the district, the survey adopted the Square Root sample 
allocation method, (Lesli Kish, 1987). This approach offers a better compromise between 
equal and proportional allocation methods in terms of reliability of both combined and 
separate estimates. The allocation of the sample points (PSUs) to rural and urban strata was 
almost proportional.  
 
Sample Selection 
The LCMSIV survey employed a two-stage stratified cluster sample design whereby during 
the first stage, 1048 SEAs were selected with Probability Proportional to Estimated Size 
(PPES). The size measure was taken from the frame developed from the 2000 Census of 
Population and Housing. During the second stage, households were systematically selected 
from an enumeration area listing. The survey was designed to provide reliable estimates at 
district, provincial, rural/urban and national levels. 
Selection of Standard Enumeration Areas (SEAs) 
The SEAs in each stratum were selected as follows: 
 (i) Calculating the sampling interval (I) of the stratum. 
  
   I = 
a
i
iM
 
Where: 
 
 
i
iM  = is the total stratum size   
  a = is the number of SEAs allocated to the stratum 
 
 (ii) Calculate the cumulated size of the cluster (SEA) 
 
(i) Calculate the sampling numbers R, R+I, R+2I,…….,R+(A-1)I, where R is the 
random start number between 1 and I. 
 
 (iv) Comparing each sampling number with the cumulated sizes 
  
The first SEA with a cumulated size that was greater or equal to the random number was 
selected. The subsequent selection of SEAs was achieved by comparing the sampling 
numbers to the cumulated sizes of SEAs. 
 
Selection of Households 
The LCMSIV survey commenced by listing all the households in the selected SEAs. In the 
case of rural SEAs, households were stratified and listed according to their agricultural 
activity status. Therefore, there were four explicit strata created in each rural SEA namely, 
the Small Scale Stratum (SSS), the Medium Scale Stratum (MSS), the Large Scale Stratum 
(LSS) and the Non-agricultural Stratum (NAS). For the purposes of the LCMSIV survey, 
about 7, 5 and 3 households were supposed to be selected from the SSS, MSS and NAS, 
respectively. The large scale households were selected on a 100 percent basis. The urban 
SEAs were implicitly stratified into low cost, medium cost and high cost areas according to 
CSO‟s and local authority classification of residential areas. 
  
 
About 15 and 25 households were sampled from rural and urban SEAs, respectively. 
However, the number of rural households selected in some cases exceeded the desired sample 
size of 15 households depending on the availability of large scale farming households. 
 
The selection of households from various strata was preceded by assigning fully responding 
households sampling serial numbers. The circular systematic sampling method was used to 
select households. The method assumes that households are arranged in a circle (G. Kalton, 
1983) and the following relationship applies: 
 
 Let N = nk, 
Where: 
 N = Total number of households assigned sampling serial numbers in a stratum 
 n = Total desired sample size to be drawn from a stratum in an SEA 
 k = The sampling interval in a given SEA calculated as k=N/n. 
 
Data Collection 
Data collection was done by way of personal interviews using a structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was designed to collect information on the various aspects of the living 
conditions of the households. 
Estimation Procedure 
Sample weights 
Due to the disproportionate allocation of the sample points to various strata, sampling 
weights are required to correct for differential representation of the sample at national and 
sub-national levels. The weights of the sample are in this case equal to the inverse of the 
product of the two selection probabilities employed. 
 
  
Therefore, the probability of selecting an SEA was calculated as follows: 
i
hi
hih
hi
M
Ma
P
1
 
Where: 
Phi
1
= the first selection probability of SEAs 
ah = The number of SEAs selected in stratum h 
M hi = The size (in terms of the population count) of the ith SEA in stratum h 
i
hiM = The total size of the stratum h 
The selection probability of the household was calculated as follows: 
N
n
P
hi
hi
hi
2
 
Where: 
Phi
2
= the second selection probability of households 
 nhi = the number of households selected from the i
th
 SEA of h stratum 
N hi  = Total number of households listed in a SEA 
Therefore, the SEA specific sample weight was calculated as follows: 
PP
W
hihi
i
x
21
1
 
 
Wi is called the PPS sample weight. In the case of rural SEAs which have more than one 
stratum, the first selection probability is multiplied with separate stratum specific second 
  
selection probabilities. Therefore, the number of weights in each rural SEA depends on the 
number of strata available. 
Estimation Process 
In order to correct for differential representation, all estimates generated from the LCMSIV 
survey data are weighted expressions. Therefore, if yhij is an observation on variable Y for the 
j
th
 household in the i
th
 SEA of the h
th
 stratum, then the estimated total for the h
th
 stratum is 
expressed as follows: 
a nh h
i j
hijhihT
ywY
1 1
 
Where: 
YhT = the estimated total for the h
th
 stratum 
i = 1 to ah: the number of selected clusters in the stratum 
j = 1 to nh: the number of sample households in the stratum 
The national estimate is obtained using the following estimator: 
YT = 
72
1k
hTY  
Where: 
YT = the national total estimate 
k = 1 to 72: the total number of strata (i.e. 72 districts). 
Data Processing and Analysis 
The data from the LCMSIV survey was processed and analysed using the CSPRO and the 
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) softwares respectively. Data entry was done from all the 
provincial offices with 100 percent verification, whilst data cleaning and analysis was 
undertaken at CSO‟s headquarters.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part E 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Policy Brief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Progressivity and determinants of out-of-pocket 
health financing in Zambia 
By  
Felix Mwenge 
Executive Summary 
  
The cost sharing policies that were implemented in the health sector in Zambia at the onset of 
the 1990s left health care seekers throughout the country looking in their pockets for money 
to pay for health services at the point of use. With the continued collapse of the Zambian 
economy two decades prior to the new policy which resulted into massive unemployment, 
declining per capita incomes and increased household poverty, one wonders if paying for 
health care in this way can favor the poor populations and promote the objective of equity in 
health care financing so desired in many health systems around the world. 
INTRODUCTION 
Out of pocket payments is one of the single largest sources of health care financing in Zambia 
and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Paying for health care in this way involves direct 
payments at the point of use of health services. However, out of pocket payments may be 
inequitable in the sense that health seekers pay the same amount regardless of having 
different initial incomes or total resources. Ideally, health care financing mechanisms should 
recognize that people differ in their ability to pay. Hence, health care payments should be 
progressive. Progressive means that those who have more resources should contribute 
proportionally more to health care financing while those with fewer resources should 
contribute proportionally less. The main purpose of this research was to find out whether out 
of pocket payments are related to the total amount of resources one has in Zambia. When this 
is the case health payments are termed as progressive. It also tries to assess the characteristics 
of households who make out of pocket payments and how these payments are distributed 
among households between the years 1998 and 2006.  
 
RESULTS 
One important aspect of this study is the findings concerning the difference in the prevalence 
of out of pocket payments between rural and urban families in Zambia. Table 1 shows the 
average amounts paid out of pocket per person in rural and urban households for the years 
1998, 2004 and 2006. 
Table 1: Average amounts paid out of pocket for health care per person by location of 
household in Zambian Kwacha
2 
Location 1998 2004 2006 
                                                          
2 exchange rates for 1998, 2004 and 2006 are K2388, K4772 and 3602 per US$1 respectively 
 
  
Rural 755 1, 842 1, 762 
Urban 2, 321 6, 173 5, 763 
All Zambia 1,322 3,532 3,157 
   
It can be seen that on average, households in rural areas spent less out of pocket compared to 
households in urban areas for all three years. This is because some households in rural areas 
may not have used health services as they may be unable to afford payments. The absolute 
amount spent OOP was however largest in 2004 compared to the other two years for both 
rural and urban areas. This decrease in out of pocket payments especially between 2004 and 
2006 can be attributed to the abolition of user fees by government in early 2006 in all primary 
health facilities. This is an important finding of the study which suggests that removing user 
fees from health facilities is one way of reducing out of pocket payments.  
 
Table 2: Proportion of households paying OOP and Average amounts paid out of pocket for 
health care per person by socio-economic group  
  
% Reporting Paying 
OOP 
Mean paid 
OOP(Kwacha
1
) 
1998 2004 2006 1998 2004 2006 
Socio-economic group 
Poorest 20% of the 
population 
11 15 13 
 
156 
 
1, 
393 
 
383 
Second Poorest 20%  
18 18 20 
411 1, 
272 
964 
Middle 20% 
21 21 20 
794 1, 
647 
1, 597 
Second richest 20%  
25 22 23 
1, 
467 
3, 
287 
2, 704 
Richest 20% of the 
population 
25 23 24 
 
4, 
170 
 
9, 
727 
 
9, 915 
All Zambia 
100 100 100 
1, 
399 
3, 
465 
3, 112 
 
The study also found that richer households paid more out of pocket compared to poorer 
households as shown in table 2. It also shows that in all the years, individuals from the 
poorest 20% of the population spent the least amount out of pocket while those from richest 
20% of the population spent the greatest amounts. This is usually the case as richer 
  
households tend to be able to afford to pay out of pocket compared to their poorer 
counterparts. 
Another important aspect of the findings of this study is the relationship between out of 
pocket payments and total household expenditure. It is generally accepted by health 
economists that higher income groups pay more of their income than lower income groups. If 
health payments are distributed in this way i.e. higher-income groups contribute a larger 
percentage of their income to financing health care than lower-income groups, they are said 
to be progressive. If the opposite is true, that is, higher-income groups contribute a smaller 
percentage of their income than lower-income groups, the system is called regressive. A good 
example of progressive contributions in Zambia is „pay as you earn‟ (PAYE) which increases 
with the more money an individual earns. OOP payments should ideally follow this pattern 
for them to be considered equitable.  
The study also identified characteristics of households or individuals in Zambia who are 
likely to pay out of pocket payments. Among them is household income (i.e. ability to pay). 
In other words, income or the amount of resources a person has determines whether he/she 
can afford to pay out of pocket for health care. The study also found that most Zambians with 
high income can afford to pay out of pocket compared with those with low income. Those 
who lived in rural Zambia in 2006 were less likely to pay out of pocket than those who lived 
in urban areas. This is obviously due to the abolition of user fees for primary health care in 
rural areas of Zambia in 2006. Additionally, if a family is large such a household is more 
likely to spend out of pocket than if the family is small. In 1998 and 2004 households headed 
by older persons were less likely to incur OOP payments compared to those headed by 
younger persons.     
CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, out of pocket payments in 1998 and 2004 were apparently related to ones total 
resources in Zambia. This is desirable and is required for a health financing system to be 
termed as equitable. It implies that well to do families contributed to health care based on 
how much they had and the same was true for the poor regardless of how much health care 
they each needed. However, this relationship only appears so because well to do families in 
Zambia are the ones who made the most out of pocket payments for health care in the two 
  
years. This is demonstrated in Table 2. Meaning that health payments could not be related to 
households‟ total resources had the poor households made as much health payments as did 
the rich. This happens because the majorities of the people in Zambia are poor and do not use 
health services because they cannot afford to pay out of pocket. Hence the observed 
relationship can be said to be so at the expense of the poor. The study also observed a 
reduction in OOP payments between 2004 and 2006. This was attributed to the abolition of 
user fees for rural primary health care in early 2006. At the same rural households were likely 
to pay less out of pocket compared to urban households. This is mainly because it is common 
in rural areas for people to self treat or seek alternative sources of care because they cannot 
afford to pay at health facilities. In view of the foregoing findings, there is need to find 
alternative ways of paying for care in Zambia where payments will be truly related to ones 
resources whether or not the poor have participated in paying for care. It is also important 
that families in Zambia are cushioned from making out of pocket payments as this may not be 
related to ones resources which is unfair especially for the poor. Alternative health financing 
mechanisms that guarantee access to care by all, and do not require health care users to pay at 
the point of use of health services should also be introduced and promoted in Zambia.  This 
will reduce the total amount of money families spend out of pocket. The study also showed 
that out of pocket payments reduced after abolition of user fees in primary facilities in the 
rural areas in 2006. This indicates that fee removal can be an effective way of reducing out of 
pocket spending for families and hence it should be recommended.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
